The following is a reformatted version of prepared remarks titled “Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review,” which Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell is delivering Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyoming:
Over the course of this year, the U.S. economy has shown resilience in a context of sweeping changes in economic policy. In terms of the Fed’s dual-mandate goals, the labor market remains near maximum employment, and inflation, though still somewhat elevated, has come down a great deal from its post-pandemic highs. At the same time, the balance of risks appears to be shifting.
今年以来，在经济政策全面变革的背景下，美国经济展现出韧性。就美联储的双重使命目标而言，劳动力市场仍接近就业最大化，通胀虽然仍略有上升，但已较疫情后高点大幅回落。与此同时，风险平衡似乎正在发生变化。
In my remarks today, I will first address the current economic situation and the near-term outlook for monetary policy. I will then turn to the results of our second public review of our monetary policy framework, as captured in the revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that we released today.
在今天的讲话中，我将首先谈及当前的经济形势和货币政策的近期前景。然后，我将谈及我们对货币政策框架进行的第二次公开审查的结果，这些结果体现在我们今天发布的《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》的修订版中。
Current Economic Conditions and Near-Term Outlook当前经济状况和近期展望
当前经济状况和近期展望
When I appeared at this podium one year ago, the economy was at an inflection point. Our policy rate had stood at 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent for more than a year. That restrictive policy stance was appropriate to help bring down inflation and to foster a sustainable balance between aggregate demand and supply. Inflation had moved much closer to our objective, and the labor market had cooled from its formerly overheated state. Upside risks to inflation had diminished. But the unemployment rate had increased by almost a full percentage point, a development that historically has not occurred outside of recessions.1 Over the subsequent three Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, we recalibrated our policy stance, setting the stage for the labor market to remain in balance near maximum employment over the past year (figure 1).
一年前，当我站在这个讲台上时，经济正处于拐点。我们的政策利率已维持在5.25%至5.5%的水平一年多。这一限制性政策立场对于降低通胀和促进总需求与总供给之间的可持续平衡是适当的。通胀已更接近我们的目标，劳动力市场也已从之前的过热状态回落。通胀的上行风险已经减弱。但失业率却上升了近一个百分点，这种情况在历史上经济衰退之外从未出现过。1 在随后的三次联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）会议上，我们重新调整了政策立场，为劳动力市场在过去一年中保持接近最大就业水平的平衡奠定了基础（图1）。
This year, the economy has faced new challenges. Significantly higher tariffs across our trading partners are remaking the global trading system. Tighter immigration policy has led to an abrupt slowdown in labor force growth. Over the longer run, changes in tax, spending, and regulatory policies may also have important implications for economic growth and productivity. There is significant uncertainty about where all of these polices will eventually settle and what their lasting effects on the economy will be.
今年，经济面临新的挑战。贸易伙伴国大幅提高关税，正在重塑全球贸易体系。更严格的移民政策导致劳动力增长急剧放缓。长远来看，税收、支出和监管政策的变化也可能对经济增长和生产力产生重要影响。所有这些政策最终将如何落地，以及它们对经济的持久影响将如何，都存在很大的不确定性。
Changes in trade and immigration policies are affecting both demand and supply. In this environment, distinguishing cyclical developments from trend, or structural, developments is difficult. This distinction is critical because monetary policy can work to stabilize cyclical fluctuations but can do little to alter structural changes.
贸易和移民政策的变化正在影响需求和供给。在这种环境下，区分周期性发展与趋势性或结构性发展十分困难。这种区分至关重要，因为货币政策可以稳定周期性波动，但难以改变结构性变化。
The labor market is a case in point. The July employment report released earlier this month showed that payroll job growth slowed to an average pace of only 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024 (figure 2). This slowdown is much larger than assessed just a month ago, as the earlier figures for May and June were revised down substantially.3 But it does not appear that the slowdown in job growth has opened up a large margin of slack in the labor market—an outcome we want to avoid. The unemployment rate, while edging up in July, stands at a historically low level of 4.2 percent and has been broadly stable over the past year. Other indicators of labor market conditions are also little changed or have softened only modestly, including quits, layoffs, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and nominal wage growth. Labor supply has softened in line with demand, sharply lowering the “breakeven” rate of job creation needed to hold the unemployment rate constant. Indeed, labor force growth has slowed considerably this year with the sharp falloff in immigration, and the labor force participation rate has edged down in recent months.
劳动力市场就是一个很好的例子。本月初发布的7月份就业报告显示，过去三个月，工资性就业岗位增长放缓至平均每月仅3.5万个，低于2024年全年的每月16.8万个（图2）。由于5月和6月的数据被大幅下调，此次放缓幅度远高于一个月前的评估。3 但就业增长放缓似乎并未导致劳动力市场出现大幅疲软——这是我们想要避免的结果。失业率虽然在7月份略有上升，但仍处于4.2%的历史低位，并且在过去一年中基本保持稳定。其他劳动力市场状况指标也几乎没有变化或仅略有下降，包括辞职、裁员、职位空缺与失业率之比以及名义工资增长。劳动力供应与需求同步下降，大幅降低了维持失业率不变所需的“盈亏平衡”就业创造率。事实上，随着移民数量的急剧下降，今年劳动力增长已大幅放缓，劳动力参与率近几个月也有所下降。
Overall, while the labor market appears to be in balance, it is a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers. This unusual situation suggests that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment.
总体而言，尽管劳动力市场看似平衡，但这种平衡却颇为奇特，其原因在于劳动力的供给和需求都显著放缓。这种异常情况表明，就业市场的下行风险正在上升。一旦这些风险成为现实，很快就会以裁员人数大幅增加和失业率上升的形式显现。
At the same time, GDP growth has slowed notably in the first half of this year to a pace of 1.2 percent, roughly half the 2.5 percent pace in 2024 (figure 3). The decline in growth has largely reflected a slowdown in consumer spending. As with the labor market, some of the slowing in GDP likely reflects slower growth of supply or potential output.
与此同时，今年上半年GDP增速显著放缓至1.2%，约为2024年2.5%增速的一半（图3）。增速下滑主要反映了消费支出放缓。与劳动力市场一样，GDP增速放缓可能部分反映了供给或潜在产出增长放缓。
Turning to inflation, higher tariffs have begun to push up prices in some categories of goods. Estimates based on the latest available data indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.6 percent over the 12 months ending in July. Excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.9 percent, above their level a year ago. Within core, prices of goods increased 1.1 percent over the past 12 months, a notable shift from the modest decline seen over the course of 2024. In contrast, housing services inflation remains on a downward trend, and nonhousing services inflation is still running at a level a bit above what has been historically consistent with 2 percent inflation (figure 4).
谈到通胀，关税上调已开始推高某些类别商品的价格。根据最新可用数据估算，截至7月的12个月内，个人消费支出（PCE）总价格上涨了2.6%。剔除波动较大的食品和能源类别，核心PCE价格上涨了2.9%，高于去年同期水平。核心商品价格在过去12个月内上涨了1.1%，与2024年全年的小幅下降相比，出现了显著转变。相比之下，住房服务通胀仍呈下降趋势，非住房服务通胀仍略高于历史上2%的通胀水平（图4）。
The effects of tariffs on consumer prices are now clearly visible. We expect those effects to accumulate over coming months, with high uncertainty about timing and amounts. The question that matters for monetary policy is whether these price increases are likely to materially raise the risk of an ongoing inflation problem. A reasonable base case is that the effects will be relatively short lived—a one-time shift in the price level. Of course, “one-time” does not mean “all at once.” It will continue to take time for tariff increases to work their way through supply chains and distribution networks. Moreover, tariff rates continue to evolve, potentially prolonging the adjustment process.
关税对消费者价格的影响如今已清晰可见。我们预计这些影响将在未来几个月内累积，且时间和幅度存在很大的不确定性。货币政策面临的关键问题是，这些价格上涨是否会大幅加剧持续通胀的风险。一个合理的基本假设是，这些影响将相对较短——价格水平只会发生一次性变化。当然，“一次性”并不意味着“一下子”。关税上调的影响仍需一段时间才能在供应链和分销网络中发挥作用。此外，关税税率仍在持续变化，这可能会延长调整过程。
It is also possible, however, that the upward pressure on prices from tariffs could spur a more lasting inflation dynamic, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed. One possibility is that workers, who see their real incomes decline because of higher prices, demand and get higher wages from employers, setting off adverse wage–price dynamics. Given that the labor market is not particularly tight and faces increasing downside risks, that outcome does not seem likely.
然而，关税对物价造成的上行压力也有可能引发更持久的通胀态势，这是一个需要评估和管理的风险。一种可能性是，由于物价上涨导致实际收入下降的工人会要求并获得更高的工资，从而引发不利的工资-物价动态。鉴于劳动力市场并非特别紧张，且面临日益加剧的下行风险，这种情况似乎不太可能发生。
Another possibility is that inflation expectations could move up, dragging actual inflation with them. Inflation has been above our target for more than four years and remains a prominent concern for households and businesses. Measures of longer-term inflation expectations, however, as reflected in market- and survey-based measures, appear to remain well anchored and consistent with our longer-run inflation objective of 2 percent.
另一种可能性是通胀预期可能上升，从而拖累实际通胀。通胀率已超过我们的目标四年多，仍然是家庭和企业的一大担忧。然而，根据市场和调查数据，长期通胀预期指标似乎依然保持稳定，并与我们2%的长期通胀目标保持一致。
Of course, we cannot take the stability of inflation expectations for granted. Come what may, we will not allow a one-time increase in the price level to become an ongoing inflation problem.
当然，我们不能想当然地认为通胀预期会稳定，无论如何，我们都不会让一次性的物价上涨演变成持续的通胀问题。
Putting the pieces together, what are the implications for monetary policy? In the near term, risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, and risks to employment to the downside—a challenging situation. When our goals are in tension like this, our framework calls for us to balance both sides of our dual mandate. Our policy rate is now 100 basis points closer to neutral than it was a year ago, and the stability of the unemployment rate and other labor market measures allows us to proceed carefully as we consider changes to our policy stance. Nonetheless, with policy in restrictive territory, the baseline outlook and the shifting balance of risks may warrant adjusting our policy stance.
综上所述，这对货币政策有何影响？短期内，通胀风险偏向上行，就业风险偏向下行——这是一个充满挑战的局面。当我们的目标如此紧张时，我们的框架要求我们平衡双重使命的两端。我们的政策利率目前比一年前更接近中性水平100个基点，失业率和其他劳动力市场指标的稳定使我们能够在考虑调整政策立场时谨慎行事。然而，由于政策处于紧缩区间，基准前景和不断变化的风险平衡可能需要我们调整政策立场。
Monetary policy is not on a preset course. FOMC members will make these decisions, based solely on their assessment of the data and its implications for the economic outlook and the balance of risks. We will never deviate from that approach.
货币政策并非预设路线。FOMC 成员将完全基于对数据及其对经济前景和风险平衡的影响的评估做出这些决定。我们永远不会偏离这一方针。
Evolution of Monetary Policy Framework货币政策框架的演变
货币政策框架的演变
Turning to my second topic, our monetary policy framework is built on the unchanging foundation of our mandate from Congress to foster maximum employment and stable prices for the American people. We remain fully committed to fulfilling our statutory mandate, and the revisions to our framework will support that mission across a broad range of economic conditions. Our revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which we refer to as our consensus statement, describes how we pursue our dual-mandate goals. It is designed to give the public a clear sense of how we think about monetary policy, and that understanding is important both for transparency and accountability, and for making monetary policy more effective.
谈到我的第二个话题，我们的货币政策框架建立在国会赋予我们的不变的授权之上，即促进美国人民实现最大就业和物价稳定。我们将继续全力致力于履行我们的法定职责，而对我们框架的修订将在广泛的经济条件下支持这一使命。我们修订后的《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》（我们称之为共识声明）阐述了我们如何追求双重授权目标。它旨在让公众清楚地了解我们对货币政策的看法，这种理解对于透明度和问责制以及提高货币政策的有效性都至关重要。
The changes we made in this review are a natural progression, grounded in our ever-evolving understanding of our economy. We continue to build upon the initial consensus statement adopted in 2012 under Chair Ben Bernanke’s leadership. Today’s revised statement is the outcome of the second public review of our framework, which we conduct at five-year intervals. This year’s review included three elements: Fed Listens events at Reserve Banks around the country, a flagship research conference, and policymaker discussions and deliberations, supported by staff analysis, at a series of FOMC meetings.5
我们在本次审查中做出的调整是自然而然的，基于我们对经济不断发展的理解。我们将继续以2012年本·伯南克主席领导下通过的初步共识声明为基础。今天的修订声明是我们框架第二次公开审查的成果，我们每五年进行一次公开审查。今年的审查包含三个要素：在全国各储备银行举办的“美联储倾听”活动、一场旗舰研究会议，以及在一系列联邦公开市场委员会会议上，由政策制定者在工作人员分析的支持下进行的讨论和审议。5
In approaching this year’s review, a key objective has been to make sure that our framework is suitable across a broad range of economic conditions. At the same time, the framework needs to evolve with changes in the structure of the economy and our understanding of those changes. The Great Depression presented different challenges from those of the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation, which in turn are different from the ones we face today.6
在筹备今年的审查时，一个关键目标是确保我们的框架适用于广泛的经济状况。同时，该框架需要随着经济结构的变化以及我们对这些变化的理解而不断发展。大萧条带来的挑战与大通胀和大缓和时期的挑战不同，而这两者又与我们今天面临的挑战不同。6
At the time of the last review, we were living in a new normal, characterized by the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound (ELB), along with low growth, low inflation, and a very flat Phillips curve—meaning that inflation was not very responsive to slack in the economy.7 To me, a statistic that captures that era is that our policy rate was stuck at the ELB for seven long years following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in late 2008. Many here will recall the sluggish growth and painfully slow recovery of that era. It appeared highly likely that if the economy experienced even a mild downturn, our policy rate would be back at the ELB very quickly, probably for another extended period. Inflation and inflation expectations could then decline in a weak economy, raising real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned near zero. Higher real rates would further weigh on job growth and reinforce the downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations, triggering an adverse dynamic.
上次审查时，我们正处于一种新常态，其特点是利率接近有效下限（ELB），同时伴随低增长、低通胀和非常平坦的菲利普斯曲线——这意味着通胀对经济疲软的反应并不灵敏。7 在我看来，一个能够体现那个时代的统计数据是，自2008年末全球金融危机爆发以来，我们的政策利率在ELB水平上停滞了长达七年之久。在座的许多人都会记得那个时代的低迷增长和痛苦缓慢的复苏。当时的情况似乎非常可能：即使经济经历哪怕是轻微的下滑，我们的政策利率也会很快回到ELB水平，而且很可能还会持续一段较长的时间。在疲软的经济中，通胀和通胀预期可能会下降，从而推高实际利率，因为名义利率被固定在接近于零的水平。更高的实际利率将进一步拖累就业增长，并加剧通胀和通胀预期的下行压力，从而引发不利的动态。
The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB and drove the2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period—and might well have done so, if not for the pandemic.8 The 2020 consensus statement included several features that addressed the ELB-related risks that had become increasingly prominent over the preceding two decades. We emphasized the importance of anchored longer-term inflation expectations to support both our price-stability and maximum-employment goals. Drawing on an extensive literature on strategies to mitigate risks associated with the ELB, we adopted flexible average inflation targeting—a “makeup” strategy to ensure that inflation expectations would remain well anchored even with the ELB constraint.9 In particular, we said that, following periods when inflation had been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.
导致政策利率达到有效下限并推动2020年框架变化的经济条件被认为源于缓慢变化的全球因素，这些因素将持续较长时间——如果不是疫情，这种情况很可能已经持续了。8 2020年的共识声明包含若干内容，旨在应对过去二十年日益突出的与有效下限相关的风险。我们强调了锚定长期通胀预期的重要性，以支持我们的价格稳定和最大就业目标。在大量关于缓解有效下限相关风险策略的文献的基础上，我们采用了灵活的平均通胀目标制——这是一种“补偿”策略，以确保即使在有效下限约束下，通胀预期也能保持良好的锚定。9 我们特别指出，在通胀持续低于2%的时期之后，适当的货币政策可能会力求在一段时间内将通胀率保持在2%的适度上方。
In the event, rather than low inflation and the ELB, the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world. Like most other central banks and private-sector analysts, through year-end 2021 we thought that inflation would subside fairly quickly without a sharp tightening in our policy stance (figure 5). When it became clear that this was not the case, we responded forcefully, raising our policy rate by 5.25 percentage points over 16 months. That action, combined with the unwinding of pandemic supply disruptions, contributed to inflation moving much closer to our target without the painful rise in unemployment that has accompanied previous efforts to counter high inflation.
结果，疫情后的重启非但没有带来低通胀和有效利率下限，反而给全球各经济体带来了40年来最高的通胀。与大多数其他央行和私营部门分析师一样，我们认为到2021年底，通胀将相当迅速地消退，而无需大幅收紧政策立场（图5）。当情况明显并非如此时，我们做出了有力的回应，在16个月内将政策利率提高了5.25个百分点。这一举措，加上疫情期间供应中断的缓解，促使通胀率更接近我们的目标，而失业率却没有像以往应对高通胀的努力那样出现痛苦的上升。
Elements of the Revised Consensus Statement修订共识声明的要素
修订共识声明的要素
This year’s review considered how economic conditions have evolved over the past five years. During this period, we saw that the inflation situation can change rapidly in the face of large shocks. In addition, interest rates are now substantially higher than was the case during the era between the GFC and the pandemic. With inflation above target, our policy rate is restrictive—modestly so, in my view. We cannot say for certain where rates will settle out over the longer run, but their neutral level may now be higher than during the 2010s, reflecting changes in productivity, demographics, fiscal policy, and other factors that affect the balance between saving and investment (figure 6). During the review, we discussed how the 2020 statement’s focus on the ELB may have complicated communications about our response to high inflation. We concluded that the emphasis on an overly specific set of economic conditions may have led to some confusion, and, as a result, we made several important changes to the consensus statement to reflect that insight.
今年的审查考量了过去五年经济状况的演变。在此期间，我们看到通胀形势在面临巨大冲击时可能迅速变化。此外，目前的利率远高于全球金融危机和疫情之间的时期。由于通胀高于目标水平，我们的政策利率具有限制性——在我看来，这种限制性是有限的。我们无法确定利率在长期内将稳定在何处，但目前的中性水平可能高于2010年代，这反映了生产力、人口结构、财政政策以及其他影响储蓄与投资平衡的因素的变化（图6）。在审查期间，我们讨论了2020年声明对有效下限的关注如何导致我们应对高通胀的沟通变得复杂。我们得出的结论是，强调过于具体的经济状况可能导致了一些混淆，因此，我们对共识声明进行了若干重要修改，以反映这一洞见。
First, we removed language indicating that the ELB was a defining feature of the economic landscape. Instead, we noted that our “monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions.” The difficulty of operating near the ELB remains a potential concern, but it is not our primary focus. The revised statement reiterates that the Committee is prepared to use its full range of tools to achieve its maximum-employment and price-stability goals, particularly if the federal funds rate is constrained by the ELB.
首先，我们删除了表明有效下限是经济格局决定性特征的措辞。取而代之的是，我们指出“我们的货币政策策略旨在促进在各种经济条件下实现最大就业和价格稳定”。在有效下限附近操作的难度仍然是一个潜在隐患，但这并非我们的主要关注点。修订后的声明重申，委员会准备动用其所有工具来实现最大就业和价格稳定目标，尤其是在联邦基金利率受到有效下限约束的情况下。
Second, we returned to a framework of flexible inflation targeting and eliminated the “makeup” strategy. As it turned out, the idea of an intentional, moderate inflation overshoot had proved irrelevant. There was nothing intentional or moderate about the inflation that arrived a few months after we announced our 2020 changes to the consensus statement, as I acknowledged publicly in 2021.
其次，我们回归了灵活的通胀目标框架，并取消了“补偿”策略。事实证明，有意、适度的通胀超调的想法已不切实际。正如我在2021年公开承认的那样，在我们宣布2020年共识声明修改几个月后出现的通胀既不是有意的，也不是适度的。
Well-anchored inflation expectations were critical to our success in bringing down inflation without a sharp increase in unemployment. Anchored expectations promote the return of inflation to target when adverse shocks drive inflation higher, and limit the risk of deflation when the economy weakens. Further, they allow monetary policy to support maximum employment in economic downturns without compromising price stability. Our revised statement emphasizes our commitment to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored, to the benefit of both sides of our dual mandate. It also notes that “price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans.” This theme came through loud and clear at our Fed Listens events. The past five years have been a painful reminder of the hardship that high inflation imposes, especially on those least able to meet the higher costs of necessities.
稳固的通胀预期对于我们成功降低通胀且避免失业率大幅上升至关重要。稳固的通胀预期能够在负面冲击推高通胀时促使通胀回归目标水平，并在经济疲软时限制通货紧缩的风险。此外，稳固的通胀预期还能使货币政策在经济低迷时期支持最大限度就业，同时又不损害价格稳定。我们修订后的声明强调，我们致力于采取有力行动，确保长期通胀预期保持稳固，以符合我们双重使命的双方利益。声明还指出，“价格稳定对于健康稳定的经济至关重要，并支持所有美国人的福祉。” 这一主题在我们的“美联储倾听”活动中得到了清晰的体现。过去五年痛苦地提醒我们，高通胀带来的困境，尤其是对那些最无力承担高昂生活必需品成本的人们。
Third, our 2020 statement said that we would mitigate “shortfalls,” rather than “deviations,” from maximum employment. The use of “shortfalls” reflected the insight that our real-time assessments of the natural rate of unemployment—and hence of “maximum employment”—are highly uncertain. The later years of the post-GFC recovery featured employment running for an extended period above mainstream estimates of its sustainable level, along with inflation running persistently below our 2 percent target. In the absence of inflationary pressures, it might not be necessary to tighten policy based solely on uncertain real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment.
第三，我们在2020年的声明中表示，我们将缓解与充分就业目标的“缺口”，而不是“偏差”。使用“缺口”一词反映了这样一种认识：我们对自然失业率（以及由此产生的“充分就业”）的实时评估具有高度不确定性。在全球金融危机后经济复苏的后期，就业率长期高于主流对其可持续水平的估计，同时通胀率持续低于我们2%的目标。在没有通胀压力的情况下，可能没有必要仅仅基于不确定的自然失业率实时估计来收紧政策。
We still have that view, but our use of the term “shortfalls” was not always interpreted as intended, raising communications challenges. In particular, the use of “shortfalls” was not intended as a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness. Accordingly, we removed “shortfalls” from our statement. Instead, the revised document now states more precisely that “the Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability.” Of course, preemptive action would likely be warranted if tightness in the labor market or other factors pose risks to price stability.
我们仍然持有这种观点，但我们对“短缺”一词的使用并非总是被理解得恰如其分，这带来了沟通方面的挑战。特别是，“短缺”一词的使用并非旨在承诺永久放弃优先行动或忽视劳动力市场的紧张程度。因此，我们从声明中删除了“短缺”。修订后的文件现在更准确地表述为：“委员会认识到，就业水平有时可能高于对充分就业的实时评估，但这不一定会给物价稳定带来风险。” 当然，如果劳动力市场的紧张或其他因素对物价稳定构成风险，则可能需要采取优先行动。
The revised statement also notes that maximum employment is “the highest level of employment that can be achieved on a sustained basis in a context of price stability.” This focus on promoting a strong labor market underscores the principle that “durably achieving maximum employment fosters broad-based economic opportunities and benefits for all Americans.” The feedback we received at Fed Listens events reinforced the value of a strong labor market for American households, employers, and communities.
修订后的声明还指出，充分就业是“在物价稳定的前提下能够持续实现的最高就业水平”。这种对促进强劲劳动力市场的关注，凸显了“持久实现充分就业将为所有美国人带来广泛的经济机会和福祉”的原则。我们在“美联储倾听”活动中收到的反馈，强化了强劲劳动力市场对美国家庭、雇主和社区的价值。
Fourth, consistent with the removal of “shortfalls,” we made changes to clarify our approach in periods when our employment and inflation objectives are not complementary. In those circumstances, we will follow a balanced approach in promoting them. The revised statement now more closely aligns with the original 2012 language. We take into account the extent of departures from our goals and the potentially different time horizons over which each is projected to return to a level consistent with our dual mandate. These principles guide our policy decisions today, as they did over the 2022–24 period, when the departure from our 2 percent inflation target was the overriding concern.
第四，与“短缺”条款的取消相一致，我们做出了一些修改，以明确我们在就业目标和通胀目标不相辅相成时期的做法。在这种情况下，我们将采取平衡的方法来促进这些目标的实现。修订后的声明现在与2012年的原始措辞更加一致。我们考虑了偏离目标的程度，以及预计每个目标恢复到符合我们双重使命的水平所需的可能不同的时间范围。这些原则指导着我们今天的政策决策，就像在2022-24年期间一样，当时偏离2%的通胀目标是首要关注的问题。
In addition to these changes, there is a great deal of continuity with past statements. The document continues to explain how we interpret the mandate Congress has given us and describes the policy framework that we believe will best promote maximum employment and price stability. We continue to believe that monetary policy must be forward looking and consider the lags in its effects on the economy. For this reason, our policy actions depend on the economic outlook and the balance of risks to that outlook. We continue to believe that setting a numerical goal for employment is unwise, because the maximum level of employment is not directly measurable and changes over time for reasons unrelated to monetary policy.
除了这些变化之外，该文件与过去的声明有很多一致性。该文件继续解释我们如何解读国会赋予我们的使命，并描述了我们认为最能促进充分就业和物价稳定的政策框架。我们仍然认为，货币政策必须具有前瞻性，并考虑其对经济影响的滞后性。因此，我们的政策行动取决于经济前景及其风险的平衡。我们仍然认为，为就业设定一个数字目标是不明智的，因为最高就业水平无法直接衡量，而且会随着与货币政策无关的原因而随时间变化。
We also continue to view a longer-run inflation rate of 2 percent as most consistent with our dual-mandate goals. We believe that our commitment to this target is a key factor helping keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored. Experience has shown that 2 percent inflation is low enough to ensure that inflation is not a concern in household and business decisionmaking while also providing a central bank with some policy flexibility to provide accommodation during economic downturns.
我们仍然认为，2%的长期通胀率最符合我们的双重使命目标。我们相信，我们对这一目标的承诺是帮助长期通胀预期保持稳定的关键因素。经验表明，2%的通胀率足够低，足以确保通胀不会成为家庭和企业决策的担忧，同时也为央行提供了一定的政策灵活性，以便在经济低迷时期提供宽松的政策。
Finally, the revised consensus statement retained our commitment to conduct a public review roughly every five years. There is nothing magic about a five-year pace. That frequency allows policymakers to reassess structural features of the economy and to engage with the public, practitioners, and academics on the performance of our framework. It is also consistent with several global peers.
最后，修订后的共识声明保留了我们大约每五年进行一次公开审查的承诺。五年一次的审查节奏并非什么神奇的魔法。这一频率使政策制定者能够重新评估经济的结构性特征，并就我们框架的绩效与公众、实践者和学者进行交流。这也与全球一些同行保持一致。
Conclusion 结论
In closing, I want to thank President Schmid and all his staff who work so diligently to host this outstanding event annually. Counting a couple of virtual appearances during the pandemic, this is the eighth time I have had the honor to speak from this podium. Each year, this symposium offers the opportunity for Federal Reserve leaders to hear ideas from leading economic thinkers and focus on the challenges we face. The Kansas City Fed was wise to lure Chair Volcker to this national park more than 40 years ago, and I am proud to be part of that tradition.
最后，我要感谢施密德主席及其全体工作人员，他们辛勤工作，每年都举办这场精彩的活动。算上疫情期间的几次线上亮相，这是我第八次有幸在此发言。每年，这场研讨会都为美联储领导人提供了聆听顶尖经济思想家观点的机会，并聚焦我们面临的挑战。40多年前，堪萨斯城联储邀请沃尔克主席来到这个国家公园，堪称明智之举，我很荣幸能够成为这一传统的一份子。
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