一场接一场的战争：派系斗争与特朗普外交政策的形成

 Summary  概括

Donald Trump prioritises headline-grabbing “wins” over the detail and substance of foreign policy.

唐纳德·特朗普更重视引人注目的“胜利”，而不是外交政策的细节和实质。

His administration has dismantled the interagency process that once filtered and vetted the policy options that reached the president, replacing it with a factional one.

他的政府拆散了曾经对提交给总统的政策选项进行筛选和审查的跨部门流程，取而代之的是派系斗争。

In the style of court politics, the factions in the White House compete to convince Trump their preferred option will serve him up the biggest win.

效仿宫廷政治，白宫各派系竞相说服特朗普，他们各自支持的方案将为他带来最大的胜利。

The fierce competition means the administration’s defence and security policy is not informed by any previously defined strategy, but is in a continuous state of renegotiation.

激烈的竞争意味着本届政府的国防和安全政策并非以任何先前制定的战略为指导，而是处于不断重新谈判的状态。

Influencing the Trump administration requires understanding that it does not make decisions like previous US administrations. Europeans can influence the factional process, but only if they can correctly perceive the factions.

要想影响特朗普政府，就必须明白它的决策方式与以往的美国政府截然不同。欧洲人可以影响派系斗争，但前提是他们能够正确理解各个派系之间的差异。

Participation prize  参与奖

“Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace … ” (Donald Trump, letter to Norwegian prime minister, January 2026)

“鉴于贵国决定不授予我诺贝尔和平奖，以表彰我制止了 8 场以上的战争，我不再觉得有义务仅仅考虑和平……” （唐纳德·特朗普，致挪威首相的信 ，2026 年 1 月）

It seems winning the inaugural FIFA peace prize was not enough for Donald Trump. Having kicked off this world cup year with a regime decapitation in Venezuela, the US president swiftly refocused on his old goal to “acquire” Greenland. He also found the time to threaten Iran’s leaders with the “Maduro treatment”, and he did not spare America’s world cup co-hosts either: Canada was treated to tariff threats and Mexico those of the military variety. In early February, the boss of global football’s governing body, Gianni Infantino, was asked whether, in hindsight, his peace prize might not have gone to the right person. His response was, “objectively, he deserves it.”

似乎赢得首届国际足联和平奖对唐纳德·特朗普来说还不够。在世界杯年伊始 ，他便在委内瑞拉推翻了政权，随后这位美国总统迅速将注意力重新集中到他“吞并”格陵兰岛的老目标上。他还抽空威胁伊朗领导人要像对待马杜罗那样对待他们，而且他对美国的世界杯联合主办国也毫不留情：加拿大受到了关税威胁，墨西哥则受到了军事威胁 。2 月初，当被问及事后看来，国际足联主席詹尼·因凡蒂诺是否应该将和平奖颁给更合适的人时，他的回答是：“客观来说，他当之无愧。”

January left European leaders reeling. They had spent the first year of Trump’s second term belatedly coming to terms with the prospect of “defending Europe with less America”. Now, they were confronted with an imperialist US and the possibility of defending Europe against America. The days of Trump’s campaign promises to put “America First” with a “president of peace” at the helm seem like a lifetime ago. The purging and sidelining of the traditional Republican foreign policy hawks (“primacists”) from the second term cabinet does not seem to have had much impact on its ideological direction. “Restrainers”, who want US policy to focus on the homeland, have not prevailed in their stead; nor have “prioritisers”, who think the focus should be the Indo-Pacific. The much-delayed publication of America’s national security strategy in December and national defence strategy in January only added to the confusion.

一月份的局面令欧洲领导人措手不及。在特朗普第二个任期的第一年，他们才姗姗来迟地接受了“ 以更少的美国力量保卫欧洲 ”的前景。如今，他们面对的却是一个帝国主义的美国，以及保卫欧洲免受美国威胁的可能性。特朗普竞选时承诺的“美国优先”和“和平总统”的时代仿佛已是遥远的过去。将传统的共和党外交政策鹰派（“首要主义者”）从第二个任期的内阁中清除出去并边缘化，似乎并未对内阁的意识形态方向产生多大影响。“克制派”希望美国政策聚焦于本土，但并未取而代之；“优先派”则认为重点应放在印太地区，同样未能占据上风。美国国家安全战略在去年 12 月姗姗来迟， 国防战略在去年 1 月才发布，这无疑加剧了局势的混乱。

Even officials close to Trump have struggled to decipher the direction of travel. What the president says and what he does often deviate from and sometimes contradict the statements of his cabinet members. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, secretary of war Pete Hegseth proclaimed America would shift political attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific, meaning Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. Then in September, Trump announced the US would keep troops in Europe and maybe even add more. The president also authorised strikes on Iran’s Fordow nuclear facilities, despite his director of the Office for National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, stating Iran was not seeking to build a nuclear weapon.

即使是特朗普的亲信官员也难以捉摸他的政策走向。总统的言行常常与内阁成员的声明相悖，有时甚至自相矛盾。5 月在香格里拉对话会上，战争部长皮特·赫格塞斯宣称， 美国将把政治注意力和资源转移到印太地区，这意味着欧洲必须承担起更大的自身安全责任。然而到了 9 月，特朗普却宣布美国将继续驻扎在欧洲，甚至可能增兵。尽管国家情报总监图尔西·加巴德表示伊朗并未寻求制造核武器，但总统仍然授权对伊朗的福尔多核设施发动袭击。

The president’s unpredictability often seems to be the only constant. But that alone does not explain the strategic cacophony of US defence and security policy over the past year. This paper argues the administration’s policy is the product of a president fixated on short-term “wins” and factional competition in the White House. The factions diverge on the scope of US military engagement and America’s role in Europe, yet converge on method: they all push their preferred outcomes by appealing to Trump’s need for visible victories, lucrative deals and shows of strength. The result is a fluid, personalised foreign policy process, in which ideology and strategy are subordinate to Trump and his wins.

总统的反复无常似乎是唯一不变的因素。但这本身并不能解释过去一年美国国防和安全政策的战略混乱。本文认为，本届政府的政策是总统痴迷于短期“胜利”以及白宫内部派系斗争的产物。各派系在美军参与的范围和美国在欧洲的角色上存在分歧，但在方法上却殊途同归：他们都迎合特朗普对可见胜利、有利可图的交易和实力展示的需求，以推动各自偏好的结果。其结果是，外交政策的制定过程变得灵活且个人化，意识形态和战略都服从于特朗普及其取得的胜利。

The case studies in this paper show how the game has played out so far in: the western hemisphere, Iran and Israel, China and Taiwan, and Russia and Ukraine. The paper then explains the implications of this for America’s global power and for Europe. US attention and resources are stretched, but all the factions seem to agree that Europe is less ally and more prey. Whatever number of American troops end up staying in Europe, they no longer belong to an ally that defines “the West” as a coalition of liberal democracies. But Europe has leverage. Europeans need to use this to defend their continent with less America and resist US economic coercion and territorial threats. But they should also use it to reassert Europe’s global power, just as their old ally’s is declining.

本文的案例研究展示了迄今为止这场博弈在以下地区的发展情况：西半球、伊朗和以色列、中国和台湾以及俄罗斯和乌克兰。文章随后阐述了这对美国全球实力和欧洲的影响。美国的注意力和资源捉襟见肘，但各方似乎都认同欧洲已不再是盟友，而更像是猎物。无论最终有多少美军驻扎在欧洲，他们都不再属于那个将“西方”定义为自由民主国家联盟的盟友。但欧洲仍然拥有影响力。欧洲人需要利用这种影响力，在减少对美国的依赖的情况下捍卫自己的大陆，并抵制美国的经济胁迫和领土威胁。同时，他们也应该利用这种影响力重塑欧洲的全球实力，正如他们昔日的盟友正在衰落一样。

A market of wins

一个充满胜利的市场

“We’re gonna win so much, you may even get tired of winning. And you’ll say, ‘Please, please. It’s too much winning. We can’t take it anymore, Mr. President, it’s too much.’ And I’ll say, ‘No it isn’t. We have to keep winning. We have to win more!’” (Donald Trump, speech to supporters, 2016 campaign trail)

“我们会赢很多，你甚至可能会赢腻。你会说，‘求求你了，求求你了。赢太多了。我们受不了了，总统先生，真的太多了。’我会说，‘不，一点也不。我们必须继续赢。我们必须赢更多！’” （唐纳德·特朗普，2016 年竞选期间对支持者的讲话 ）

Winning is one of Trump’s enduring fixations. This extends to his performative proclivities in foreign policy. Indeed, the president seems uninterested in the substance of policy, as long as it serves his desire for foreign policy victories, lucrative deals and shows of strength. The people around him have seized on his priorities as they try to define his agenda according to their ideologies and interests.

胜利是特朗普始终执着的目标之一。这甚至延伸到他在外交政策上的作秀倾向。事实上，只要政策能够满足他追求外交胜利、获取丰厚利润和展现实力的愿望，这位总统似乎对政策实质漠不关心。他身边的人也抓住了他的优先事项，试图根据自身的意识形态和利益来定义他的议程。

My ECFR colleague Jeremy Shapiro calls this process “factionalism”. In the style of court politics, restrainers, prioritisers and primacists craft versions of wins to serve up to the president. Trump’s extractive streak also inspires the billionaires and investors in his orbit, who suggest lucrative opportunities to get his interest in, say, Greenland. The intense competition means Trump’s foreign and security policy is not a finished product of some sort of previously defined strategy, but rather a continuous process of competition between the factions and outside influences, whereby the outcome (policy) is in a permanent state of renegotiation.

我的欧洲对外关系委员会同事杰里米·夏皮罗将这一过程称为“ 派系斗争 ”。如同法庭政治一般，克制派、优先派和首要派精心炮制出各种版本的胜利方案，以迎合总统。特朗普的掠夺倾向也激发了他身边的亿万富翁和投资者，他们提出各种有利可图的机会，以吸引他对格陵兰岛等地的兴趣。这种激烈的竞争意味着，特朗普的外交和安全政策并非某种预先设定的战略的最终产物，而是各派系和外部影响之间持续博弈的结果，其政策也始终处于不断重新谈判的状态。

Presidential priorities  总统优先事项

To be clear, Trump has some stable views about the world and America’s place within it. These seem to come from long-held grievances about US trade deficits and security alliances, as well as his disdain for liberal democracy and affinity with illiberal strongmen. Accordingly, his administrations have started a trade war with the world in both terms. They have also consistently demanded bigger contributions from allies for American protection. And they have generally been willing to use leverage to force America’s allies into a corner on trade and security. The same cannot be said for America’s traditional rivals. China’s leader Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin have seen less US leverage and more dealmaking than with previous American presidents, given Trump has unburdened himself of the normative considerations of his predecessors.

需要明确的是，特朗普对世界以及美国在世界中的地位有一些稳定的看法。这些看法似乎源于他对美国贸易逆差和安全联盟长期以来的不满，以及他对自由民主的蔑视和对非自由主义强人的亲近。因此，他的政府在两个任期内都对世界各国发动了贸易战。他们还一贯要求盟友为美国的保护做出更大贡献。而且，他们通常愿意利用影响力在贸易和安全问题上迫使美国的盟友陷入困境。但对于美国的传统对手，情况则截然不同。鉴于特朗普摆脱了其前任所受的规范性考量，中国领导人习近平和俄罗斯领导人普京感受到的美国的影响力比以往任何一位美国总统都要小，而交易的次数则更多。

Besides these beliefs, Trump appears to have few ideological priors on matters of national security. Private anecdotes and media reports suggest he does not spend much time going into substance of foreign policy. He also, by his own admission, has a short attention span. His instincts seem to tilt towards restraint, but this is selective. As Shapiro has documented, the president seems distinctly doveish towards powers like Russia and China. Yet he has authorised military action against, for instance, Houthis in the Red Sea, Iran and Venezuela.

除了这些信念之外，特朗普在国家安全问题上似乎缺乏意识形态上的先入之见。私人轶事和媒体报道表明，他很少花时间深入探讨外交政策的实质内容。而且， 他自己也承认 ，他的注意力难以集中。他的本能似乎倾向于克制，但这是一种选择性的克制。正如沙皮罗所记录的那样，总统对俄罗斯和中国等大国的态度明显偏向鸽派。然而，他却授权对红海胡塞武装、伊朗和委内瑞拉等国采取军事行动。

Ultimately, “winning” seems far more important than ideology. Throughout his second term, the president has shown a pronounced desire to score and visibly demonstrate foreign policy victories, prioritising headline impact over everything else. In some cases, these claims rest on genuine but limited achievements. Notably, US pressure and regional mediation contributed to the 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. This enabled the release of Israeli and foreign hostages held by Hamas: a concrete humanitarian outcome. But there is no sign this ceasefire will hold, nor turn into a durable peace in the Middle East.

最终，“胜利”似乎远比意识形态重要。在其第二个任期内，总统表现出强烈的渴望，力图在外交政策上取得并大肆宣扬胜利，将媒体关注度置于一切之上。在某些情况下，这些胜利的确建立在真实但有限的成就之上。值得注意的是，美国的压力和地区斡旋促成了以色列和哈马斯之间2025年的停火协议。这使得被哈马斯扣押的以色列和外国人质得以获释：这是一项具体的人道主义成果。但没有任何迹象表明这项停火协议能够维持下去，或者最终转化为中东的持久和平。

Rather, the president’s most sweeping claims often rely on exaggeration or relabelling short-term developments as historic breakthroughs. His assertions that he ended six, seven then “8 Wars PLUS” conflates fragile ceasefires, de-escalations and even non-wars into a single narrative of triumph. Overall, Trump prioritises symbolic and performative wins over strategic ones; the point is that the president can declare a victory and move on.

相反，总统最夸张的说法往往依赖于夸大其词，或将短期进展重新包装成历史性突破。他声称自己结束了六场、七场，乃至“八场战争”，这种说法将脆弱的停火、局势降级，甚至非战争混为一谈，构建成一个单一的胜利叙事。总而言之，特朗普更看重象征性和作秀式的胜利，而非战略性的胜利；关键在于，总统可以宣布胜利，然后继续推进下一步。

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Of course, making lucrative deals is what “winners” do. Trump’s extractive foreign-policy approach is visible not just in the economic and trade realm, but also in security. Since returning to office, the president has repeatedly framed US engagement abroad through financial or commercial gains rather than value of alliances, shared rules and long-term stability. He expresses his goals as “getting paid”, “getting something back” or making money for the US.

当然，达成有利可图的交易是“赢家”的惯用伎俩。特朗普的掠夺性外交政策不仅体现在经济和贸易领域，也体现在安全领域。自重返总统职位以来，他一再将美国在海外的参与定义为获取经济或商业利益，而非联盟的价值、共同规则和长期稳定。他将自己的目标表述为“赚钱”、“有所回报”或“为美国创造财富”。

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Winners are also strong. The motto “Peace through strength” and repeated criticism of Joe Biden’s weakness as a cause of Russia’s aggression of Ukraine was at the centre of Trump’s 2024 campaign. Similarly, Trump’s actions and rhetoric during both terms in office show an ambition to demonstrate strength and decisiveness in foreign policy, often prioritising an immediate show of “toughness” over long-term concerns.

胜利者往往也实力强劲。“以实力求和平”的口号以及对乔·拜登软弱无能的反复批评——认为这是俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的原因——是特朗普2024年竞选的核心。同样，特朗普在两届总统任期内的行动和言论都展现出在外交政策上展现实力和果断的雄心，他常常优先考虑短期内展现“强硬”姿态，而非长远考量。

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These three priorities combine with the factional policymaking process to create the unstable equilibrium that characterises Trump’s defence and security policy.

这三项优先事项与派系决策过程相结合，形成了特朗普国防和安全政策特有的不稳定平衡。

Factional warfare  派系战争

As Shapiro describes, Trump’s first term saw the president become increasingly convinced of a “deep state” collusion to undermine his agenda. This has led him to replace the traditional “interagency” policymaking process with a factional one. In the interagency model, the National Security Council (NSC) coordinated the work of the Department of State, the Pentagon and Intelligence agencies. The agencies deliberated US foreign policy in a structured, bureaucratic manner. They vetted proposals carefully and presented the president with several policy options from which he would choose “the best” option. While competition always existed, the options and ultimately US foreign policy tended to emerge from institutional consensus.

正如沙皮罗所描述的那样，特朗普的第一任期内，他越来越相信存在一个“深层政府”的阴谋，旨在破坏他的施政纲领。这导致他用派系林立的决策模式取代了传统的“跨部门”决策模式。在跨部门模式下，国家安全委员会（NSC）负责协调国务院、五角大楼和情报机构的工作。各机构以结构化的官僚方式审议美国外交政策。他们仔细审查提案，并向总统提交若干政策选项，供其选择“最佳”方案。虽然竞争始终存在，但最终的选项以及美国的外交政策往往源于机构内部的共识。

But the second Trump administration has gutted the NSC, sharply reducing its size, influence and expertise. In May 2025 the president dismissed his national security adviser, the primacist Mike Waltz, along with a host of senior policy professionals. He has replaced them with a much smaller cadre of loyal appointees. The NSC is effectively led by secretary of state Marco Rubio (also a primacist, but a loyal one), who has also assumed the role of acting national security adviser. The NSC thus no longer functions as the centre of interagency coordination. Instead, national security decision-making has become increasingly centralised within the White House.

但特朗普第二任期大幅削减了国家安全委员会（NSC）的规模、影响力和专业能力。2025 年 5 月，总统解雇了奉行首要主义的国家安全顾问迈克·沃尔兹，以及一大批高级政策专家。取而代之的是一小批忠于自己的任命官员。国家安全委员会实际上由国务卿马可·卢比奥（同样奉行首要主义，但忠于总统）领导，卢比奥同时兼任代理国家安全顾问。因此，国家安全委员会不再发挥跨部门协调中心的作用。相反，国家安全决策权日益集中于白宫。

The president still has plenty of help choosing “the best” policy option. But under the factional model, these choices emerge from competition among Trump’s appointees to define his agenda according to their ideological outlook. The restrainers and prioritisers have mobilised around the vice-president J.D. Vance. The primacists have coalesced around Rubio. The prioritisers cluster in the Pentagon, which is led by culture warrior Pete Hegseth, so have to work through him to get to Trump.

总统在选择“最佳”政策方案时仍然拥有充足的支持。但在派系林立的模式下，这些选择源于特朗普任命的官员之间根据各自意识形态来制定其政策议程的竞争。“克制派”和“优先派”聚集在副总统万斯周围。“首要派”则围绕卢比奥而聚。“优先派”集中在五角大楼，该部门由文化斗士皮特·赫格塞斯领导，因此他们必须通过赫格塞斯才能直接与特朗普沟通。

The president states his preferences plainly and the factions respond in kind—offering arrangements that give Trump the visible victories, lucrative deals and shows of strength he craves. But the factions are also entrepreneurial, often using such wins to lure the president’s limited attention and lack of interest in details to their pet projects. Businessfolk and billionaires in Trump’s orbit have also made their foreign policy views known and are promoting their own ideas. The Greenland scheme reportedly came from billionaire Ronald Lauder back in 2018; the Gaza plan was concocted between Trump’s son in law Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff (Trump’s friend and long-time business associate), and Ron Dermer, the closest advisor of Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Billionaires Miriam Adelson and Bill Ackman, Trump’s two biggest donors, have weighed in to shape policy on Israel and Iran. Witkoff and Kushner have also become highly influential on Russia and Ukraine.

总统直言不讳地表达了自己的偏好，各派系也以同样的方式回应——提出各种安排，为特朗普带来他渴望的显性胜利、丰厚利润和强硬姿态。但这些派系也颇具商业头脑，他们常常利用这些胜利来吸引总统有限的注意力，以及总统对细节的漠不关心，从而将精力投入到他们各自的项目中。特朗普圈子里的商界人士和亿万富翁也纷纷公开表达了他们的外交政策观点，并积极推行自己的理念。 据报道， 格陵兰岛计划早在 2018 年就出自亿万富翁罗纳德·劳德之手；加沙计划则是由特朗普的女婿贾里德·库什纳、特使史蒂夫·威特科夫（特朗普的朋友和长期商业伙伴）以及以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的亲密顾问罗恩·德默共同炮制的。特朗普的两大金主、亿万富翁米里亚姆·阿德尔森和比尔·阿克曼也参与了对以色列和伊朗政策的制定。威特科夫和库什纳在俄罗斯和乌克兰问题上也拥有巨大的影响力。

Of course, the role of business interests and donors in US domestic and foreign policy is not new. Unusual here is Trump’s open and unapologetic embrace of an extractive worldview: foreign policy exists to generate deals, repayments and visible commercial wins. Conflicts are re-framed as development opportunities. Gaza is a property and infrastructure problem that should be resolved through real-estate development, rather than meticulous negotiation with due attention to historical details and politically sensitive issues. Unlike previous presidents, Trump does not mask his business logic in strategic or moral language; nor does he allow his policy to be limited by any normative or institutional constraints.

当然，商业利益和捐助者在美国内政外交政策中扮演的角色并非新鲜事。不同寻常的是，特朗普公开且毫不掩饰地拥抱了一种掠夺性的世界观：外交政策存在的目的就是为了达成交易、获得回报和取得看得见的商业利益。冲突被重新定义为发展机遇。加沙问题被视为财产和基础设施问题，应该通过房地产开发来解决，而不是通过细致的谈判，并充分考虑历史细节和政治敏感问题。与以往的总统不同，特朗普没有用战略或道德语言来掩盖其商业逻辑；他也不允许自己的政策受到任何规范或制度约束。

This being foreign policy, outside actors have also entered the game. They mostly align with the primacist faction in their quest to keep America engaged in their respective wars and have crafted wins of their own for the president. Israel, for example, gave Trump a show of strength via its military strikes on Iran in June 2025. European leaders carefully choreographed a NATO summit (among other things), with the alliance’s secretary-general Mark Rutte framing the pledge from European members to spend 5% of GDP on defence as Trump’s “BIG” success.

外交政策领域自然也少不了外部势力的介入。他们大多与第一性原理派系结盟，力图让美国继续卷入各自的战争，并为总统打造了属于他们自己的“胜利”。例如，以色列在 2025 年 6 月对伊朗发动军事打击，向特朗普展示了实力。欧洲领导人精心策划了北约峰会（以及其他一些举措），北约秘书长马克·吕特将欧洲成员国承诺将国内生产总值的 5%用于国防开支，标榜为特朗普的“重大”成就。

This all combines to produce consistent inconsistency in US defence and security policy across the western hemisphere, Iran and Israel, China and Taiwan, and Russia and Ukraine.

所有这些因素加在一起，导致美国在西半球、伊朗和以色列、中国和台湾以及俄罗斯和乌克兰等地的国防和安全政策出现持续的不一致性。

The western hemisphere: When foreign is domestic

西半球：当外国变成国内

Trump has long framed crime in US cities and drug trafficking as “liberal problems”. During his first term, the Justice Department indicted Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro on narco-terrorism and cocaine-trafficking charges. In his second term, Trump and his cabinet use a narrative connecting drug flows from Venezuela to threats to America’s national security. Further east in the hemisphere, Lauder reportedly first approached Trump with his thoughts about Greenland in 2018. Back then, Trump framed the acquisition as a purchase. But his appetites were curbed by half-functioning interagency process that has since degraded.

特朗普长期以来一直将美国城市的犯罪和毒品走私问题定义为“自由派问题”。在他第一任期内，司法部以毒品恐怖主义和可卡因走私罪名起诉了委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗。在第二任期内，特朗普及其内阁将来自委内瑞拉的毒品流动与美国国家安全面临的威胁联系起来。据报道，在更东边的西半球，劳德早在2018年就向特朗普表达了他对格陵兰岛的想法。当时，特朗普将此次收购描述为一次购买。但由于当时跨部门流程运转不畅，他的收购计划受到了限制，而这一流程此后更是雪上加霜。

The state of play: The national security and defence strategies prioritise homeland security and the western hemisphere. The former heralds “a Trump corollary to the Monroe doctrine”; the latter includes five explicit references to Greenland and its importance for America’s national security. Nevertheless, the documents likely tell Europeans more about the state of the factional competition at the end of 2025 than the strategic direction of Trump’s America.

现状 ：国家安全和国防战略优先考虑国土安全和西半球。前者预示着 “特朗普对门罗主义的补充”；后者则五次明确提及格陵兰岛及其对美国国家安全的重要性。然而，这些文件或许更多地向欧洲人揭示了 2025 年底各派系之间的竞争格局，而非特朗普治下美国的战略方向。

The deployment of troops to the southern border reflect longstanding restrainer demands. Much to the chagrin of these restrainers, however, on January 3rd Rubio and the primacists assisted Trump with a hat-trick of wins in Venezuela. The capture of Maduro and his wife was just the kind of impressive military operation that appeals to Trump. It was a show of strength that came with the opportunity to post about his victory on social media. And, on the surface, it appeared to come with oil deals. The success of the Venezuela operation seemingly emboldened Trump, who quickly turned his attention to Iran and Greenland.

向南部边境部署军队反映了长期以来克制派的呼吁。然而，令这些克制派大为恼火的是，1 月 3 日，卢比奥和那些支持第一人称单方面进攻的人士协助特朗普在委内瑞拉取得了三连胜。 抓捕马杜罗及其妻子正是特朗普所期待的那种令人印象深刻的军事行动。这既是一次实力展示，也让他有机会在社交媒体上炫耀胜利。而且，表面上看，似乎还达成了石油交易。委内瑞拉行动的成功似乎鼓舞了特朗普，他迅速将目光转向伊朗和格陵兰岛。

The first year: Over 2025, the second Trump administration militarised Democrat-led cities and surged resources to the southern border, also amassing the largest US naval presence in the Caribbean since the Panama crisis in 1965. This was all part of a supposed crackdown on crime and drug cartels, with Rubio and Vance both adjusting their rhetoric to make its contradictions more digestible for the MAGA base. Trump’s longstanding interest in acquiring Greenland rumbled along in the background throughout the year, causing periodic diplomatic crises with NATO ally Denmark—for instance, in response to alleged US influence operations in the territory.

第一年 ：在 2025 年，特朗普第二任期政府将民主党执政的城市军事化，并向南部边境增派资源，同时在加勒比海地区集结了自 1965 年巴拿马危机以来规模最大的美国海军力量。这一切都被冠以打击犯罪和贩毒集团之名，卢比奥和万斯都调整了他们的言论，以使其中的矛盾更容易被“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）的支持者接受。特朗普长期以来对收购格陵兰岛的兴趣在这一年中持续发酵，并引发了与北约盟国丹麦的周期性外交危机——例如，丹麦指责美国在该地区开展影响力行动。

In mid-August, the US began its military build-up in the Caribbean. It began to strike what it claimed were “drug boats” in September, which by the end of December had resulted in more than 100 civilian deaths. On October 1st, the White House formally notified Congress that America was engaged in a “non-international armed conflict” against drug cartels in the Caribbean. These operations took place against a backdrop of a disproportionate naval build-up off the Venezuelan coast, which Hegseth in November rebranded “Operation Southern Spear”. They also took place in the framework of a fierce behind the scenes battle between restrainers and primacists to convince Trump of the best way forward.

8 月中旬，美国开始在加勒比海地区集结兵力。9 月，美国开始打击其声称的“毒品运输船”，到 12 月底，这些行动已造成 100 多名平民死亡。10 月 1 日，白宫正式通知国会，美国正在加勒比海地区对贩毒集团进行“非国际性武装冲突”。与此同时，美国在委内瑞拉沿海地区也进行了规模不成比例的海军集结，赫格塞斯在 11 月将其重新命名为“南方之矛行动”。此外，这些行动还发生在各方势力激烈的幕后博弈之中，一方是克制派，另一方是激进派，他们都试图说服特朗普采取最佳行动方案。

Restrainers opposed military intervention in Venezuela. In their view, the US focus on the homeland and the southern border was always supposed to happen instead of, not alongside, US military adventures and commitments abroad. They also drew parallels between Venezuela and Iraq—not least the dubious intelligence around the “narco-terrorist” accusations levelled at Maduro. Restrainers thus saw the survival of the Maduro regime as a lesser evil than what they assumed would turn into a lengthy invasion. Before Trump cut off diplomatic channels in October, negotiations had reportedly resulted in an offer from Maduro to provide US companies near-exclusive access to Venezuela’s oil and minerals. Trump himself acknowledged that Maduro offered “everything” to head off escalation. An extractive win was on the table even with Maduro still in power.

克制派反对对委内瑞拉进行军事干预。他们认为，美国应该始终将重心放在本土和南部边境，而不是与海外军事行动和承诺并行。他们还将委内瑞拉与伊拉克相提并论 ——尤其是针​​对马杜罗的“毒品恐怖分子”指控，其情报来源存疑 。因此，克制派认为，马杜罗政权的存续比他们预想的旷日持久的入侵要好得多。据报道，在特朗普 10 月切断外交渠道之前，谈判已达成一项协议 ，马杜罗将向美国公司提供近乎独家的委内瑞拉石油和矿产开采权。特朗普本人也承认，马杜罗为了避免局势升级，做出了“ 一切努力 ”。即使马杜罗仍在位，美国仍有机会从资源掠夺中获利。

But Rubio and the primacists topped this up with offers of a show of strength and a headline-grabbing victory. Part of the problem for restrainer officials was that they had undermined their own position by adopting the primacist narrative that wove the evils of the Maduro regime into the domestic “drugs and crime” story. Primacists duly weaponised this to argue that a secure southern border sometimes involves regime change. They also sold removing Maduro as a way for Venezuela’s oil sector to open up under a new government and push Russian and Chinese companies out of the country. But neither restrainers nor primacists inconvenienced the president with the practicalities of their version of the extractive deal. US oil executives have since made clear that Venezuela’s oil sector is a financial black hole, requiring massive upfront investment with little prospect of returns. No matter, the meticulously planned operation went ahead and returned no American casualties.

但卢比奥和那些支持优先权的人士还承诺要展现实力，并赢得一场足以登上头条的胜利。对那些持克制立场的官员来说，部分问题在于他们采纳了优先权人士的叙事，将马杜罗政权的罪恶与国内的“毒品和犯罪”问题交织在一起，从而削弱了自身的立场。优先权人士巧妙地利用这一点，声称确保南部边境安全有时需要政权更迭。他们还宣称，推翻马杜罗是让委内瑞拉石油行业在新政府领导下开放 ，并将俄罗斯和中国公司赶出该国的途径。然而，无论是克制派还是优先权人士，都没有就他们各自版本的采掘协议的实际操作问题与总统交涉。美国石油公司的高管们后来明确表示 ，委内瑞拉的石油行业是一个无底洞，需要巨额的前期投资，却几乎没有回报。尽管如此，精心策划的行动还是顺利进行，而且没有造成任何美方人员伤亡。

Trump then claimed his victory and moved on, rapidly. In an interview with the Atlantic on January 4th, the president made clear his newfound enthusiasm for interventionism may not end with Venezuela. He said America “need[s] Greenland, absolutely” because the territory is “surrounded by Russian and Chinese ships”. This snowballed into in a two-week long transatlantic crisis. It also underlined the lack of institutional constraints in the administration and the role of Trump’s business network (in this case, Lauder) in pitching ideas to the president. Lauder’s project likely appealed to Trump’s aim to assure his own historical greatness through territorial expansion. It also reflects the president’s view of sovereignty and territory as something powerful states take when they want.

随后，特朗普宣布胜选并迅速转移阵地。1 月 4 日，在接受 《大西洋月刊》 采访时，总统明确表示， 他对干涉主义的新热情可能不会止步于委内瑞拉。他说， 美国“绝对需要格陵兰岛”，因为该岛“被俄罗斯和中国的船只包围”。此事迅速演变成一场持续两周的跨大西洋危机。这也凸显了本届政府缺乏制度约束，以及特朗普的商业网络（在本例中是劳德）在向总统推销想法方面所起的作用。劳德的计划很可能迎合了特朗普通过领土扩张来确保自身历史地位的野心。这也反映了总统对主权和领土的看法，即强国可以随意夺取领土。

Behind closed doors, people close to the administration suggest neither the primacists nor the restrainers support the acquisition of Greenland.[1] The restrainers oppose it since it would involve investment and financing that may be siphoned away from their domestic priorities, with little hope of profiting from Greenland’s energy resources any time soon. A potential conflict with an ally for territorial gain also clashes fundamentally with their desire to avoid overseas military entanglements. The primacists are loath to imperil America’s global power by damaging the NATO alliance, possibly beyond repair. Only hardline confidants like Stephen Miller, Trump’s homeland security adviser, pushed openly for military takeover of the island, claiming “nobody is going to fight the US over the future of Greenland.”

据接近政府内部人士透露，在闭门会议上，无论是优先派还是克制派都不支持吞并格陵兰岛。 [1] 克制派反对吞并格陵兰岛，因为这将涉及投资和融资，而这些资金可能会从他们的国内优先事项中转移出去，而且短期内几乎不可能从格陵兰岛的能源资源中获利。与盟友争夺领土的潜在冲突也与他们避免海外军事冲突的愿望根本相悖。优先派不愿通过损害北约联盟（这种损害可能是不可挽回的）来危及美国的全球实力。只有像特朗普的国土安全顾问斯蒂芬·米勒这样的强硬派亲信公开推动军事接管该岛， 声称 “没有人会为了格陵兰岛的未来与美国开战”。

Trump’s Greenland escalations gained traction in large part because no disciplined interagency process exists to filter them out. Despite their private misgivings, restrainers and primacists in the administration did not oppose Trump’s Greenland plans. Trump prizes loyalty, after all. The factions instead fought over how to reframe and implement Trump’s ambitions. Rubio insisted America would buy Greenland, while attempting to reassure NATO and Congress with remarks that the administration planned “to eventually purchase Greenland”, as opposed to using military force. Vance recast the idea as a tactical show of leverage from the president, consistent with the territory’s importance for America’s missile defence. And just like that, Lauder’s near-decade old idea became US policy.

特朗普在格陵兰岛问题上的升级行动之所以能够迅速推进，很大程度上是因为缺乏一套规范的跨部门机制来过滤和处理这些行动。尽管政府内部的克制派和优先派人士私下里有所顾虑，但他们并没有反对特朗普的格陵兰岛计划。毕竟，特朗普重视忠诚。各派系之间的争论焦点在于如何重新定义和实施特朗普的野心。卢比奥坚持认为美国将会购买格陵兰岛，同时试图通过强调政府计划“最终购买格陵兰岛”，而不是动用武力，来安抚北约和国会。万斯则将这一想法重新定义为总统展示影响力的策略，这与该领土对美国导弹防御的重要性相符。就这样，劳德近十年前的想法变成了美国的政策。

The next move: At January’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Trump announced he had reached the “framework of a future deal” with Rutte and stepped back from threats of tariffs and military force. This “deal” reportedly encompassed Greenland itself and NATO’s defence of the wider Arctic region. But the details remain undefined. Meanwhile in Venezuela, the Maduro regime remains largely intact and in control of the military and the government. The Trump administration does not seem to have a plan for what comes next: Trump has lost interest (for the moment) and factional wrangling continues. Also ongoing are the US navy’s operations in the Caribbean. Their focus on stopping subsidised oil flows from Venezuela to Cuba suggests the intention is to apply indirect pressure on the government in Havana, where regime change is reported to be Rubio’s longstanding goal.

下一步： 在 1 月份的达沃斯世界经济论坛上，特朗普宣布他已与英国首相吕特达成 “未来协议框架”，并放弃了加征关税和动用武力的威胁。据报道，这项“协议”涵盖了格陵兰岛本身以及北约对更广泛北极地区的防御。但具体细节仍未确定。与此同时，在委内瑞拉，马杜罗政权基本保持完整，并继续掌控着军队和政府。特朗普政府似乎没有下一步计划：特朗普（目前）已经失去了兴趣，而各派系之间的斗争仍在继续。美国海军在加勒比海的行动也在进行中。他们专注于阻止委内瑞拉向古巴输送补贴石油，这表明其意图是对哈瓦那政府施加间接压力，据报道，推翻委内瑞拉政权一直是卢比奥的长期目标。

Iran and Israel: When strikes are restraint

伊朗和以色列：打击何时才是克制？

The Middle East was at the heart of the Trumpist foreign policy revolution of 2016. The restrainer movement is deeply rooted in the experience of America’s war in Iraq in 2003, which triggered a backlash in the party against the Bush-era elite. Trump ran on a combination of a restrainer and Iran-hawkish platform in 2016, promising to bring US troops home from the region and end costly “forever wars”. In 2024, he campaigned on the promise of ending the Israel’s war in Gaza, and early in his term in office reached out to Iranian leadership to broker a new nuclear deal. In June 2025, the US joined Israeli military strikes on Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility.

中东是2016年特朗普外交政策革命的核心。克制主义运动深深植根于2003年美国入侵伊拉克的经历，这场战争引发了民主党内部对布什时代精英的强烈反弹。特朗普在2016年竞选时，将克制主义和对伊朗强硬的立场结合起来，承诺从该地区撤回美军，并结束代价高昂的“无休止的战争”。2024年，他以结束以色列在加沙的战争为竞选纲领，并在上任初期就与伊朗领导人接触，试图促成一项新的核协议。2025年6月，美国参与了对伊朗福尔多核设施的军事打击。

The state of play: After the strikes in June, the primacists and Israel seemed to have given Trump just the kind of win he needs: a show of strength that enabled him to declare victory and move on. But this soon evolved into something less settled, with restrainers claiming such one-off surgical strikes were in keeping with their vision, and primacists (and Israel) viewing Iran as unfinished business. In December 2025, a wave of anti-government protests swept Iran. Trump threatened miliary strikes in support of the protesters, seemingly emboldened by the success of the Venezuela operation. This might have finished said business for Israel and the prioritisers. But Trump backed down reportedly under pressure from Saudi Arabia and other powers in the region. At the time of writing, Trump’s rhetoric had evolved into demands for a deal and “NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS” ahead of talks scheduled for February 6th.

现状 ：6 月空袭之后，优先派和以色列似乎给了特朗普他所需要的胜利：一次强硬的姿态，使他能够宣布胜利并继续前进。但这种情况很快变得不那么稳定，克制派声称这种一次性的精准打击符合他们的设想，而优先派（以及以色列）则认为伊朗问题尚未解决。2025 年 12 月，伊朗爆发了反政府抗议浪潮。特朗普威胁要对抗议者进行军事打击，似乎是受到了委内瑞拉行动成功的鼓舞。这或许能让以色列和优先派彻底了结伊朗问题。但据报道，特朗普在沙特阿拉伯和该地区其他国家的压力下做出了让步。截至撰写本文时，特朗普的言论已转变为要求达成协议，并在定于 2 月 6 日举行的会谈前强调“ 不发展核武器 ”。

The first year: The restrainer versus primacist battle began at the very start of the second term. Vance and his advisers, backed up by top-tier officials in the Pentagon and the Office of National Intelligence, were eager to avoid military confrontation with Iran and pushed for a political solution to deny the country the ability to build nuclear weapons. They acknowledged that securing extended restrictions on Iranian nuclear activity would require US concessions, such as economic benefits for Iran and limited uranium enrichment consistent with civilian needs.

第一年 ：克制派与优先派之间的斗争在第二个任期伊始便拉开帷幕。万斯及其顾问，在五角大楼和国家情报局高层官员的支持下，急于避免与伊朗发生军事冲突，并力主通过政治途径阻止伊朗拥有核武器能力。他们承认，要确保对伊朗核活动实施长期限制，美国必须做出让步，例如向伊朗提供经济利益，以及在符合民用需求的范围内限制铀浓缩活动。

The primacist camp included Waltz, as well as the head of US Central Command, General Michael Kurilla and senators Tom Cotton and Lindsey Graham. They aligned with Netanyahu’s approach, which involved the full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear programme via military force. Their view was that Iran should not be allowed to enrich any uranium, and they argued for provisions like restrictions on missiles.

首要主义阵营的成员包括沃尔兹、美国中央司令部司令迈克尔·库里拉将军以及参议员汤姆·科顿和林赛·格雷厄姆。他们与内塔尼亚胡的方针一致 ，即通过武力彻底摧毁伊朗的核计划。他们的观点是，不应允许伊朗进行任何铀浓缩活动，并主张对伊朗的导弹发展进行限制等措施。

Many influential people around Trump aligned with the primacists in pressing for military intervention and regime change. They included representatives of Rupert Murdoch’s media empire, most notably Fox News host Mark Levin. But also billionaire contributors to Trump’s campaign, including Ackman, who made multiple explicit pro-intervention statements on X in mid-June 2025; and Adelson, whom Trump credited in his speech to the Israeli Knesset in October 2025 as having helped shape US decisions on Israel.

特朗普身边许多有影响力的人物都与那些主张军事干预和政权更迭的人士站在同一阵线。这些人包括鲁珀特·默多克媒体帝国的代表，其中最引人注目的是福克斯新闻主持人马克·莱文 。此外，还有特朗普竞选活动的亿万富翁捐助者，例如阿克曼，他在 2025 年 6 月中旬就 X 问题发表了多份明确支持干预的声明 ；以及阿德尔森，特朗普在 2025 年 10 月对以色列议会的演讲中，称赞阿德尔森帮助塑造了美国对以色列的决策。

But Vance and the restrainers also had the support of strong MAGA voices outside the cabinet. These included congresswoman Majorie Taylor Greene, TV host Tucker Carlson, former White House advisor Steve Bannon, and executive director of American Conservative Curt Mills. All were, and remain, against US alignment with Israel. In their eyes, the underlying goal of the military operation was to sabotage diplomatic talks and pursue regime change. Vance himself worried about “mission creep” into a regime change operation and was staunchly against military action. In private conversations, restrainers claim that Kurilla, Waltz, Graham and Cotton tried to persuade Trump to redeploy the forces the US used against the Houthis in March to attack Iran. They say the primacists deliberately tried to conceal the costs of a potential military operation against Iran and were searching for any evidence that Iranians were supporting the Houthis to justify expanding the military operation.[2]

但范斯和那些持不同意见者也得到了内阁之外一些强有力的“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）支持者的支持。这些人包括国会议员玛乔丽·泰勒·格林、电视主持人塔克·卡尔森、前白宫顾问史蒂夫·班农以及美国保守派组织“美国保守派”（American Conservative）的执行主任科特·米尔斯。他们过去和现在都反对美国与以色列结盟。在他们看来，军事行动的根本目的是破坏外交谈判并推翻伊朗政权。范斯本人也担心行动会演变成政权更迭，并坚决反对军事行动。据持不同意见者称，在私下谈话中，库里拉、沃尔兹、格雷厄姆和科顿曾试图说服特朗普将美国 3 月份用于打击胡塞武装的部队重新部署到伊朗。他们表示，这些“首要主义者”故意隐瞒了对伊朗潜在军事行动的成本，并四处寻找伊朗支持胡塞武装的证据，以证明扩大军事行动的合理性。 [2]

In keeping with his instincts, the president initially leaned towards the restrainer approach. In public, he maintained a credible threat of use of force to incentivise Iran to make a deal, and did not rule out US participation in Israeli-led strikes. In private, he opposed the Israeli strikes, which led him to persuade Netanyahu to delay Israel’s military initiative in April and once again in May. Witkoff did the same, and the envoy’s initial offer to Iran would have allowed it continue limited nuclear enrichment, subject to strict monitoring. Under pressure from primacists and Israel’s leadership, however, the US position on the nuclear deal hardened to no enrichment.

总统最初秉持克制立场，这符合他的本能。公开场合，他持续发出使用武力的可信威胁，以促使伊朗达成协议，并且不排除美国参与以色列领导的空袭行动。私下里，他反对以色列的空袭，这促使他劝说内塔尼亚胡在 4 月和 5 月两次推迟以色列的军事行动。维特科夫也采取了同样的做法，这位特使最初向伊朗提出的方案允许其在严格监控下继续进行有限的核浓缩活动。然而，在首要主义者和以色列领导层的压力下，美国在核协议问题上的立场变得强硬 ，最终决定不再允许伊朗进行任何核浓缩活动。

Indeed, between April and the end of June, Trump’s Iran policy and public discourse underwent more fundamental shifts. He moved from opposing military action, to distancing America from Israel’s strikes, to approving US participation in the Israeli bombing of Iran and claiming ownership over the operation’s reported success. Why this turn? Why did the primacist faction prevail? Waltz and his entire team were out of the picture, which arguably had something to do with their hawkish position on Iran and Russia. All indicators suggested that Trump would not intervene in Israel’s conflict with Iran.

事实上，从四月到六月底，特朗普的伊朗政策和公开言论发生了更为根本性的转变。他从反对军事行动，到试图与以色列的空袭保持距离，再到批准美国参与以色列对伊朗的轰炸，并声称对此次行动的成功负有责任。这种转变的原因是什么？为什么优先考虑伊朗的立场最终占了上风？沃尔兹及其整个团队都已退出政坛，这或许与他们对伊朗和俄罗斯的强硬立场有关。所有迹象都表明，特朗普不会干预以色列与伊朗的冲突。

The New York Times reports this began to shift after a phone call between Trump and Netanyahu on June 9th. In that call, Netanyahu said the strikes were going ahead, with or without the US, and that Israel already had forces on the ground. The ingenuity of Israeli planning reportedly impressed the president, who after the call told his advisers: “I think we might have to help him”. Following Israel’s precision strikes on June 13th, Trump reportedly began to change his mind about his public rhetoric and claim some credit for Israel’s success. That is, Israel’s show of strength moved him from opposing Israel’s military intervention to supporting it, or more accurately, “owning” Israel’s military accomplishments.

《 纽约时报》 报道称， 这一转变始于 6 月 9 日特朗普与内塔尼亚胡的一次通话。在通话中，内塔尼亚胡表示，无论美国是否参与，空袭行动都将如期进行，以色列地面部队已经部署到位。据报道，以色列周密的计划给特朗普留下了深刻印象，通话结束后，他告诉顾问：“我想我们或许应该帮帮他。” 6 月 13 日以色列精准打击行动后，据报道，特朗普开始改变其公开言论，并开始承认以色列的成功对其有所贡献。也就是说，以色列展现出的实力使他从反对以色列的军事干预转变为支持以色列，或者更准确地说，是“认可”以色列的军事成就。

Ultimately, the strikes gave Trump an opportunity to show off America’s strength and counter the “Trump always chickens out” (TACO) criticism. They also helped enhance US leverage in nuclear negotiations with Iran. Israel’s leadership thus delivered a win for Trump. But Trump remains a dove militarily and, again, moves quickly on having claimed his win. This was most visible when he lashed out at Netanyahu before taking off for the NATO summit in the Hague, criticising Israel for bombing Iran after the ceasefire had been announced.

最终，这些空袭让特朗普有机会展示美国的实力，并反驳“ 特朗普总是临阵退缩 ”（TACO）的批评。它们还有助于提升美国在与伊朗的核谈判中的筹码。以色列领导层因此为特朗普带来了一场胜利。但特朗普在军事上仍然保持鸽派立场，并且再次迅速地宣布胜利。这一点在他启程前往海牙参加北约峰会前猛烈抨击内塔尼亚胡时表现得最为明显， 他批评以色列在停火协议宣布后轰炸伊朗。

Through the strikes, the president disappointed restrainers in his cabinet. He publicly undermined Gabbard and his own intelligence agencies, claiming their assessment of Iran had not decided to build a nuclear bomb was wrong. And yet, Trump’s quick exit from the “joint military venture” allowed Vance to frame the US intervention, which was in fact a primacist project, in restrainer terms. He argued it was an example of effective surgical action essential to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development, while managing to keep the US out of another “forever war” in Middle East. He also commended it as a tenet of Trump’s new “foreign policy doctrine”.

通过这些空袭，总统令内阁中的克制派失望。他公开贬低加巴德和自己的情报机构，声称他们对伊朗尚未决定制造核武器的评估是错误的。然而，特朗普迅速退出“联合军事行动”，却让万斯得以用克制派的措辞来包装美国的干预行动——而这实际上是一项以先发制人为目的的行动。他辩称，这是阻止伊朗核武器发展所必需的有效外科手术式行动的典范，同时还能避免美国卷入另一场在中东的“无休止的战争”。他还称赞这是特朗普新“外交政策理论”的一项重要原则。

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But the primacists continued to express concerns about the Iranian threat. They questioned whether the enriched uranium was genuinely destroyed or simply moved from the Fordow facility before the strikes. Jeniffer Griffin, FOX news chief national security correspondent, was at the forefront of this effort. Hegseth, her former colleague, contradicted her in a fiery exchange at the end of June. By November 2025, the situation in Iran was best described as a dangerous stalemate. No diplomatic talks were happening, the US had no clear idea of status of Iran’s uranium stockpile and there was no external insight into the state of Iran’s nuclear programme.

但那些主张核安全的人仍然对伊朗的威胁表示担忧。他们质疑浓缩铀是否真的被销毁，还是仅仅在空袭前从福尔多核设施转移走了。福克斯新闻首席国家安全记者詹妮弗·格里芬是这场争论的先锋。她的前同事赫格塞斯在六月底的一次激烈辩论中反驳了她的观点。到 2025 年 11 月，伊朗局势可以用“ 危险的僵局” 来形容。外交谈判停滞不前，美国对伊朗的铀库存状况一无所知，外界也无法了解伊朗核计划的进展。

The next move: Far from aiming to finish unfinished business, Trump’s new threats seem to have emerged from a sense of invincibility after the wins of Venezuela. They are likely tactics of intimidation, based on the assumption that the Maduro operation shows Trump does not “always chicken out”. Strikes on regime targets in Iran would carry serious risks of retaliation that Trump has consistently sought to avoid. Whether primacists or restrainers get what they want will therefore depend on how costly military action would be in terms of the risk of escalation and US casualties. Back in March 2025, Trump quickly disengaged from the campaign against the Houthis once American costs became clear. This is likely a more reliable indicator of where he goes on Iran than either the June 2025 strikes or the Venezuela operation. His late January shift to nuclear dealmaking suggests that may be a fruitful route for restrainers and US allies in the region to focus the construction of their wins.

下一步： 特朗普的新威胁似乎并非旨在完成未竟之事，而是源于委内瑞拉战果后他所感受到的无敌感。这些威胁很可能是一种恐吓策略，其依据是马杜罗行动表明特朗普并非“总是临阵退缩”。对伊朗政权目标发动袭击会带来严重的报复风险，而特朗普一直试图避免这种情况。因此，主张优先行动者或克制者能否如愿以偿，将取决于军事行动的代价，包括局势升级的风险和美军伤亡。早在 2025 年 3 月，特朗普在意识到美国付出的代价后，便迅速停止了对胡塞武装的军事行动。这或许比 2025 年 6 月的空袭或委内瑞拉战果更能可靠地预示他对伊朗问题的走向。他在 1 月下旬转向核协议谈判，表明这或许是该地区克制者及其盟友巩固自身胜利成果的有效途径。

China and Taiwan: When deals are deterrence

中国与台湾：当协议成为威慑手段时

When it comes to China, Trump’s restrainer tendencies have been on show since he first became the Republican presidential candidate in 2016. “Strategic rivalry” does not seem to feature in his vocabulary. He has refused to confirm whether he would defend Taiwan if China pursued “reunification” by military force, and has accused the former of stealing America’s advantage in semiconductor technology. Across two terms, Trump’s China policy has focused on imposing high tariffs on Chinese imports to force a better trade deal for the US.

自2016年首次成为共和党总统候选人以来，特朗普在对华问题上一直表现出克制倾向。“战略竞争”似乎不在他的考虑范围之内。他拒绝明确表态，如果中国以武力追求“统一”，他是否会保卫台湾，并指责中国窃取了美国在半导体技术领域的优势。在特朗普的两个任期内，其对华政策主要集中于对中国进口商品加征高额关税，以迫使中国与美国达成更有利的贸易协议。

The state of play: Trump’s China policy departs from the preferences of both the primacists and the prioritisers. Hegseth focuses more on culture wars than actual wars, which leaves Colby to deal with matters of policy. This has resulted in an uneasy hybrid: as staff in the Pentagon try to enhance America’s capacity to fight China, Trump pursues economic detente with Beijing (while Hegseth posts memes on social media). Trump’s tendencies are also a rupture from the bipartisan consensus that the deterrence of China should include strong economic security measures.

现状： 特朗普的对华政策既不符合首要主义，也不符合优先主义。赫格塞斯更关注文化战争而非实际战争，这使得科尔比不得不处理政策问题。这导致了一种尴尬的混合局面：五角大楼的幕僚们试图提升美国对抗中国的能力，而特朗普却在寻求与北京的经济缓和（与此同时，赫格塞斯还在社交媒体上发布表情包）。特朗普的倾向也与两党共识相悖，即对华威慑应包括强有力的经济安全措施。

The first year: Primacists and prioritisers agree Taiwan is crucial for US national security. They also agree China is America’s greatest strategic rival. Colby and his team see Taiwan as a first line of defence against Chinese expansion to more islands in the Indo-Pacific. Their “deterrence by denial” doctrine demands a robust military buildup and burden-sharing with Indo-Pacific allies in the region to convince China’s leaders aggression on Taiwan would fail.

第一年： 先验主义者和优先主义者都认同台湾对美国国家安全至关重要。他们也一致认为中国是美国最大的战略对手。科尔比及其团队将台湾视为抵御中国向印太地区更多岛屿扩张的第一道防线。他们的“拒止威慑”理论要求加强军事建设，并与印太地区的盟友分担责任，以使中国领导人相信侵略台湾将会失败。

But Trump seems to have limited interest in confronting China. According to former administration officials, early in his second term Trump forbade any discussions of China war plans in the Pentagon; the officials claimed Trump was furious about Elon Musk’s presence in such talks. This was not because it was in breach of protocol but because the president objected to them happening at all.[3] Other media reports suggested the president tends to downplay the risks of Chinese military action against Taiwan, viewing the island primarily as a bargaining chip in the wider US-China relationship. Some commentators, including former officials, argue that Taiwan could be part of a grand bargain with China that includes trade and export concessions.

但特朗普似乎对对抗中国兴趣有限。据前政府官员透露，特朗普在其第二个任期初期就禁止五角大楼讨论任何针对中国的战争计划；这些官员称，特朗普对埃隆·马斯克参与此类会谈感到愤怒。这并非因为会谈违反了相关规定，而是因为总统反对此类会谈的发生。 [3] 其他媒体报道显示， 总统倾向于淡化中国对台湾采取军事行动的风险，主要将台湾视为美中关系中一个谈判筹码。一些评论人士，包括前官员， 认为台湾可以成为与中国达成一项包含贸易和出口让步的重大协议的一部分。

These tensions are visible in the national defence strategy. In the document, any language alluding to power projection in the Indo-Pacific nestles under a White House comfort blanket. On page three, for example, it states that Trump “seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China, and he has shown that he is willing to engage President Xi Jinping directly to achieve those goals”. It adds: “We will open a wider range of military-to-military communications with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a focus on supporting strategic stability … deconfliction and de-escalation.” But the next paragraph pivots to deterrence. It claims that the US is “clear-eyed and realistic about the speed, scale, and quality of China’s historic military buildup” and the goal to “set the military conditions … to prevent anyone, including China, from dominating us or our allies”.

这些紧张关系在国家国防战略中显而易见。该文件中，任何提及在印太地区投射力量的措辞都笼罩在白宫的舒适区之下。例如，在第三页，文件指出特朗普“寻求与中国建立稳定的和平、公平的贸易和相互尊重的关系，并且他已表明愿意与习近平主席直接接触以实现这些目标”。文件还补充道：“我们将与中国人民解放军（PLA）开展更广泛的军事沟通，重点是支持战略稳定……缓和冲突和减少紧张局势。”但下一段却转向了威慑。文件声称，美国“对中国历史性的军事建设的速度、规模和质量有着清醒而务实的认识”，其目标是“创造军事条件……以防止任何一方，包括中国，支配我们或我们的盟友”。

A similar disconnect exists in the administration’s economic security policy. The national security strategy emphasises US goals to counter China’s coercive economic practices, protect America’s technological advantages and secure US supply chains. But the president seems happy to deal with Beijing bilaterally. In April, Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese imports which gradually escalated to 145% in a tit-for-tat tariff war. China also slapped global export controls on rare earths. This forced the administration into retreat, with Trump granting Beijing concessions on sensitive technologies in exchange for a pause in the export controls. Later in 2025, president allowed China greater access to advanced Nvidia microchips. On chips, the factions seem to be doing what they can to nudge things in their preferred direction. The Financial Times reports that, while the Commerce Department relaxed export restrictions on the sale of Nvidia’s H200 chips to China in January 2026, the State Department is pressing for tighter controls to curb the approval of these licences.

类似的脱节也存在于本届政府的经济安全政策中。国家安全战略强调美国的目标，即应对中国的胁迫性经济行为，保护美国的科技优势，并确保美国供应链的安全。但总统似乎乐于与北京进行双边谈判。今年 4 月，特朗普对中国进口商品加征关税，并在针锋相对的关税战中逐步升级至 145%。中国也对稀土实施了全球出口管制。这迫使美国政府做出让步，特朗普同意在敏感技术领域对北京做出让步，以换取暂停出口管制。2025 年晚些时候，总统允许中国更多地获取英伟达的先进微芯片。在芯片领域，各方似乎都在竭尽所能地推动事态朝着各自希望的方向发展。《 金融时报》 报道称，尽管商务部在 2026 年 1 月放宽了对英伟达 H200 芯片向中国出口的限制，但国务院仍在施压，要求加强管制，以限制此类许可证的审批。

The next move: US policy on China and Taiwan will likely remain caught between the president’s ambitions, and the administration’s stated goals and its practical constraints in implementing them. China showed it would not hesitate to impose such constraints in response to Trump’s tariff escalation, which seems to have been driven purely by tactics not strategy. The president now appears keen not to disturb his tentative ceasefire with Beijing. It therefore seems unlikely that Trump would sign off on robust US military containment of China in the Indo-Pacific, despite the factions’ common interest in deterring Beijing. And if Shapiro is right about Trump’s aversion to escalation with “strong” countries, the president will remain opposed to military planning for a Taiwan contingency. In early 2026, Trump moved the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier group from the Indo-Pacific to the Persian Gulf to threaten the less conventionally powerful Iranian regime.

下一步 ：美国对华台政策很可能仍将徘徊在总统的雄心壮志、政府既定目标以及实际执行上的种种限制之间。中国已表明，面对特朗普的关税升级，它毫不犹豫地会采取此类限制措施，而特朗普的关税升级似乎纯粹出于战术而非战略考量。总统现在似乎不愿打破与北京达成的暂时停火协议。因此，尽管各方都希望遏制北京，但特朗普不太可能批准美国在印太地区对中国采取强有力的军事遏制措施。如果沙皮罗关于特朗普厌恶与“强权”国家发生冲突的论断属实，那么总统仍将反对为应对台湾局势制定军事计划。2026 年初，特朗普将“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号航母战斗群从印太地区调往波斯湾，以威慑实力相对较弱的伊朗政权。

Russia and Ukraine: When profit is peace

俄罗斯与乌克兰：当利益即和平

Trump appears to harbour great mistrust towards Ukraine: he has repeatedly blamed the country for his first impeachment, for his 2020 election loss and for allegedly concealing Joe Biden’s supposed corrupt activities there. Trump’s instinct to disengage from the war in Ukraine was especially evident during the 2024 election campaign. He repeatedly vowed to “end the war in 24 hours”, insisting he could press both sides into a deal. That deal has persistently failed to materialise, and Trump has threatened to walk away from the whole thing on more than one occasion.

特朗普似乎对乌克兰抱有极大的不信任感：他曾多次指责乌克兰导致他首次遭到弹劾、2020 年大选失利，并声称乌克兰隐瞒了乔·拜登在乌克兰的腐败行为。在 2024 年总统竞选期间，特朗普想要从乌克兰战争中脱身的意图尤为明显。他多次誓言 “24 小时内结束战争”，坚称自己能够迫使双方达成协议。 然而，这项协议始终未能实现，特朗普也不止一次威胁要退出整个事件。

The state of play: Witkoff and Kushner, aligned with Vance and the restrainers, are offering Trump a quick deal through territorial trade-offs and normalisation with Russia. Primacists and Europeans, aligned with Rubio, are trying to re-anchor talks around deterrence and security guarantees. In December 2025, Witkoff’s so-called 28-point plan was leaked to the media. This emphasised Ukrainian concessions on territory and sovereignty, likely with the aim of convincing Putin to let Trump have his elusive win. But the backlash from Kyiv and its allies in Europe, as well as Congress, enabled Rubio to partially reassert control by insisting on quasi-Article 5 security guarantees and bigger post-war armed forces for Ukraine. Primacists acknowledge, however, that the White House will use these changes to intensify pressure on Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to make concessions on Donbas.

当前局势： 维特科夫和库什纳与万斯及其温和派结盟，试图通过领土交换和与俄罗斯关系正常化，为特朗普提供快速达成协议的方案。而与卢比奥结盟的先验主义者和欧洲人则试图将谈判重新聚焦于威慑和安全保障。2025 年 12 月，维特科夫所谓的“28 点计划” 被泄露给媒体。该计划强调乌克兰在领土和主权问题上做出让步，其目的很可能是为了说服普京让特朗普赢得这场来之不易的胜利。然而，来自基辅及其欧洲盟友以及美国国会的强烈反对，使得卢比奥得以部分重新掌控局面 ，他坚持要求乌克兰提供类似第五条规定的安全保障，并扩充战后乌克兰的武装力量。不过，先验主义者也承认 ，白宫将利用这些变化加大对乌克兰总统泽连斯基的压力，迫使其在顿巴斯问题上做出让步。

The first year: Trump quickly appointed duelling envoys, Witkoff and General Kieth Kellogg, to set the tone for the restrainer versus primacist battle on Ukraine. Witkoff was already in Trump’s good books, having brokered a short-lived ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in the weeks before the president took office, and it seems Trump viewed him as capable of pulling off a similar win in Ukraine. Kellogg’s vision was somewhat different. He argued that to end the war, the US should use its ample leverage and escalate to de-escalate. But this sat uneasily with a cabinet increasingly encouraged by Vance to focus on normalisation with Russia. By March, Kellogg had been demoted to “Ukraine envoy only” and marginalised from core negotiations. He stepped down altogether in January 2026.

第一年： 特朗普迅速任命了两位对立的特使——维特科夫和基思·凯洛格将军，以期在乌克兰问题上确立克制派与激进派之争的基调。维特科夫此前已在特朗普的信任圈内，因为在特朗普就职前几周， 他曾促成以色列和哈马斯之间短暂的停火，特朗普似乎认为他有能力在乌克兰问题上取得类似的胜利。凯洛格的设想则有所不同。他认为，为了结束战争，美国应该利用其强大的影响力，通过升级来缓和局势。但这与内阁的立场格格不入，因为在万斯的鼓励下，内阁越来越倾向于将重点放在与俄罗斯的关系正常化上。到了 3 月份，凯洛格被降职为“仅负责乌克兰事务的特使”，并被边缘化，无缘参与核心谈判。他于 2026 年 1 月彻底卸任 。

A similar division between primacists and restrainers existed in the US government and Trump’s cabinet. The view of the primacists is that preventing a Russian victory is the only way to uphold American credibility and NATO cohesion, and deter future Russian aggression. Graham was initially among the staunchest primacists on Ukraine. The restrainer camp, represented at the most senior level by Vance, favours a negotiated settlement, a reduction of US assistance and the transfer of responsibility for Ukraine’s defence entirely to Europe. They see political and economic reset with Moscow is strategically necessary because a less hostile relationship between Russia and the West could reduce the former’s dependence on China. Escalation with Russia, in restrainer eyes, also locks America into an open-ended conflict with no clear advantages for the homeland.

美国政府和特朗普内阁内部也存在类似的优先派和克制派之争。优先派认为，阻止俄罗斯获胜是维护美国信誉和北约团结、遏制俄罗斯未来侵略的唯一途径。格雷厄姆最初是乌克兰问题上最坚定的优先派之一。以万斯为最高级别的代表人物的克制派则倾向于通过谈判解决问题，减少美国援助，并将乌克兰的防务责任完全移交给欧洲。他们认为 ，与莫斯科进行政治和经济关系的重置在战略上是必要的，因为俄罗斯与西方之间不那么敌对的关系可以降低俄罗斯对中国的依赖。在克制派看来，与俄罗斯的冲突升级也会使美国陷入一场对本土没有任何明显好处的无休止的冲突。

Publicly, both camps adjusted their rhetoric over the course of the year to remain in sync with the president. But privately, they continued to push competing solutions. This clash became visible in April, around the time of the proposed US-Ukraine critical-minerals deal. Graham framed this as win for Trump by boasting that Ukraine was home to $10trn-$12trn in minerals and rare earths. He sweetened it by claiming America should secure these resources before Russia or China did. But Vance helped derail the deal through the infamous Oval Office confrontation with Zelensky. Former officials say that, shortly after the incident, restrainers around Vance tried to get the president to suspend intelligence sharing and weapons deliveries to Ukraine.[4] In the Pentagon, meanwhile, a group of prioritisers with China on their minds paused certain ammunition shipments to Ukraine. Trump quickly reversed this amid complaints the state department and White House had not been fully briefed.

公开场合，双方阵营在这一年中调整了措辞，以与总统保持一致。但私下里，他们仍在推进各自不同的解决方案。这种冲突在 4 月份变得尤为明显，当时正值美乌关键矿产资源协议提案提出之际。格雷厄姆将此举包装成特朗普的胜利， 吹嘘乌克兰拥有价值 10 万亿至 12 万亿美元的矿产和稀土资源。他还进一步声称，美国应该在俄罗斯或中国之前确保这些资源的获取。但万斯与泽连斯基在椭圆形办公室那次臭名昭著的对峙， 最终导致该协议破裂 。前官员称，事件发生后不久，万斯身边的一些人试图劝说总统暂停与乌克兰的情报共享和武器交付。 [4] 与此同时，在五角大楼，一些优先考虑中国利益的官员暂停了向乌克兰运送某些弹药。在有人抱怨国务院和白宫没有得到充分的情况汇报后，特朗普迅速撤销了这一决定。

These events stirred European leaders to enter the game as a de facto extension of the primacist camp. Seeking to shape Trump’s thinking on Ukraine was Rutte, as well as the German chancellor Friedrich Merz, Finnish president Alexander Stubb and British prime minister Keir Starmer. Through persuasion and flattery, they worked to repair relations between Trump and Zelensky and discourage an at-any-cost deal with Russia. They pressed for clear red lines before any Trump-Putin summit and urged additional sanctions on Moscow should the Russian president fail to agree to a deal. Through charm diplomacy and carefully staged symbolic gestures, they served up “wins” for Trump—from royal receptions to defence-spending commitments from NATO allies.

这些事件促使欧洲领导人加入这场博弈，实际上成为了“首要主义阵营”的延伸。试图影响特朗普对乌克兰问题想法的包括英国首相吕特、德国总理默茨、芬兰总统施图布和英国首相斯塔默。他们通过劝说和奉承，努力修复特朗普与泽连斯基的关系，并阻止特朗普不惜一切代价与俄罗斯达成协议。他们力促在特朗普与普京峰会之前划定明确的红线，并敦促对莫斯科实施更多制裁，以防俄罗斯总统拒绝达成协议。他们运用魅力外交和精心策划的象征性姿态，为特朗普争取“胜利”——从皇室接见到北约盟国承诺增加国防开支。

As one senior European official put it, their goal was to move Trump from a quick deal to a position of “benign neutrality” on Ukraine, while keeping America invested, politically and militarily, in European security.[5] Their efforts succeeded in buying time. Trump appeared to abandon his initial inclination to force Kyiv into accepting unfavourable terms. He also authorised weapons sales through NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL). Indeed, he even approved US intelligence assistance for Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, in moves restrainers would have deemed escalatory.

正如一位欧洲高级官员所言，他们的目标是促使特朗普从迅速达成协议转向对乌克兰采取“善意中立”的立场，同时确保美国在政治和军事上继续关注欧洲安全。 [5] 他们的努力成功地争取了时间。特朗普似乎放弃了最初强迫基辅接受不利条款的倾向。他还通过北约的“乌克兰优先需求清单”（PURL） 授权向乌克兰出售武器。事实上，他甚至批准了美国情报部门协助乌克兰打击俄罗斯能源基础设施，而这些举措在克制派看来会被视为局势升级。

Yet just as primacists seemed to be gaining the upper hand, a business-oriented camp was cooking up a win for Trump that appealed to his taste for lucrative deals. This group included Witkoff, Kushner and other businessmen close to Trump, and had full support of the restrainers. Their idea was to frame the war less as a military struggle and more as a frozen economic opportunity, and their vision of peace revolved around commercial reintegration with Russia. As the Wall Street Journal reported in November, Witkoff, Kushner and Russian sovereign wealth fund chief Kirill Dmitriev explored an array of ideas to bring Russia’s two-trillion dollar economy “in from the cold”.

然而，正当那些主张优先考虑利益的人似乎占据上风之际，一个以商业利益为导向的阵营正在酝酿一项有利于特朗普的方案，以满足他对利润丰厚的交易的偏好。这个阵营包括维特科夫、库什纳和其他与特朗普关系密切的商人，并得到了克制派的全力支持。他们的想法是将这场战争的性质从军事斗争转移到经济机遇的把握上，而他们对和平的设想则围绕着与俄罗斯的商业重新融合展开。正如《 华尔街日报》 11 月报道的那样，维特科夫、库什纳和俄罗斯主权财富基金总裁基里尔·德米特里耶夫探讨了一系列方案，旨在让俄罗斯两万亿美元的经济体“摆脱困境”。

This business-driven logic found its way into the national security strategy, which emphasises economic strength, transactional diplomacy and flexibility over ideological or military confrontation with Russia. This is quite a departure from both the restrainers’ and the primacists’ traditional ideological lines. Trump’s first year back in office thus ended in a fragile equilibrium, almost a compromise, between the factions. Restrainers still dominated Trump’s instinct to end to the war quickly by using leverage over Kyiv to give up territories, and a reset with Russia became the administration’s formal objective according to the national security strategy. But the primacists have slowed (though not reversed) the push for territorial compromise by re-inserting security guarantees and allied buy-in.

这种以商业为导向的逻辑渗透到了国家安全战略中，该战略强调经济实力、交易型外交和灵活性，而非与俄罗斯进行意识形态或军事对抗。这与克制派和首要派的传统意识形态路线都大相径庭。因此，特朗普重返总统宝座的第一年以各派之间脆弱的平衡，近乎一种妥协告终。克制派仍然主导着特朗普的本能，即利用对基辅的影响力迫使其放弃领土，从而迅速结束战争，而根据国家安全战略，与俄罗斯“重启”关系也成为了本届政府的正式目标。但首要派通过重新引入安全保障和争取盟友的支持，减缓了（尽管并未完全逆转）领土妥协的步伐。

The next move: Of course, Putin is very likely to keep refusing the deal. This could force Trump back towards the Vance line rather than pursuing the more complicated, costly package which involves a serious commitment of US resources and European-backed security guarantees.

下一步： 当然，普京很可能继续拒绝这项协议。这可能会迫使特朗普回归万斯的路线，而不是追求更为复杂、成本更高的方案——该方案涉及美国投入大量资源以及欧洲支持的安全保障。

Everyone’s a loser, baby

每个人都是失败者，宝贝。

“Europeans can order Patriots, but they’ll receive them in 2035. We are no longer the arsenal of democracy. That is a real constraint.” (Author’s conversation with former Pentagon official, Brussels, June 2025)

“ 欧洲人可以订购爱国者导弹系统，但他们要到 2035 年才能收到。我们不再是民主的武器库了。这是一个真正的限制。” （作者与前五角大楼官员在布鲁塞尔的对话，2025 年 6 月）

No faction has managed to assert stable influence on Trump’s foreign policy. Greenland is the president’s “thing” and an irritant for primacists and restrainers alike. Rubio served up wins for Trump in Venezuela, but the administration has no visible strategy for what comes next. The US crackdown on shadow fleet vessels sending Venezuelan oil to Cuba suggests the secretary of state may have his eye on regime change there. But restrainer backlash may (or may not) leave him disappointed, as might Trump’s focus on Greenland.

没有任何派系能够对特朗普的外交政策施加稳定的影响力。格陵兰岛是总统的“心头好”，令优先主义者和克制主义者都感到恼火。卢比奥在委内瑞拉问题上为特朗普赢得了胜利，但特朗普政府对于下一步行动却没有明确的战略。美国打击向古巴输送委内瑞拉石油的“影子舰队”船只，表明国务卿可能正着眼于古巴政权更迭。但克制主义者的反弹可能会（也可能不会）让他失望，特朗普对格陵兰岛的关注也可能如此。

On Iran, Trump alienated the restrainers by breaking his promise to avoid new wars in the Middle East. He disappointed the prioritisers too, since the president’s backing for Israel’s war involved US forces and missile-defence systems prioritisers want for the Indo-Pacific. Like in the western hemisphere, primacists temporarily gained the upper hand on Iran. Yet this seems to have been more a coincidental alignment between Israel’s show of strength and primacist objectives than a durable strategic shift. Trump’s January 2026 climbdown from his bellicose rhetoric likely reflected Gulf state lobbying, as well as Trump’s pattern of taking things to the brink then pulling back. But that may not last.

在伊朗问题上，特朗普违背了避免在中东发动新战争的承诺，疏远了那些主张克制的阵营。他也令那些优先考虑印太地区的阵营失望，因为总统对以色列战争的支持涉及美军和导弹防御系统，而这些正是优先考虑印太地区战略的阵营所希望看到的。与西半球的情况类似，优先考虑印太地区的阵营在伊朗问题上暂时占据了上风。然而，这似乎更多是以色列展示实力与优先考虑印太地区战略目标之间的一种巧合，而非持久的战略转变。特朗普在 2026 年 1 月收敛其好战言论， 很可能反映了海湾国家的游说，以及特朗普惯于将事态推向边缘后又退缩的模式。但这或许不会持续太久。

On the Indo-Pacific, latent prioritiser dominance in the Pentagon seeped somewhat into the national defence strategy. But Trump’s emphasis on dealmaking with Beijing sits uneasily with Pentagon advisers’ goal of sustaining credible deterrence, and US policy on China and Taiwan remains just as unstable as it is elsewhere. Its defining characteristic seems to be the tension between the president’s instincts and the bipartisan consensus that China is America’s biggest rival and poses the gravest threat to US interests.

在印太地区，五角大楼潜在的优先权主导地位在一定程度上渗透到了国防战略中。但特朗普强调与北京达成交易的做法与五角大楼顾问维持可信威慑的目标存在冲突，美国对华和对台政策仍然像在其他领域一样不稳定。其最显著的特征似乎是总统的个人直觉与两党共识之间的张力，即中国是美国最大的竞争对手，对美国利益构成最严重的威胁。

On Russia and Ukraine, primacists have not enjoyed the same luck as they have elsewhere. Trump has been true to form in refusing a to take a tougher approach to Russia. But restrainers are not in control either, despite their alignment with the president’s instincts and the preferences of the business interests around him. This is arguably because of Putin’s steadfast refusal to let Trump have his deal. It also reflects primacist and European efforts to reframe the terms of negotiation whenever Vance and friends seem to be crossing the line. At the time of writing, this dynamic shows little sign of changing—despite a series of direct talks taking place between America, Russia and Ukraine.

在俄罗斯和乌克兰问题上，首要主义阵营的运气不如他们在其他领域。特朗普一如既往地拒绝采取对俄强硬立场。但尽管克制派与总统的本能以及他身边的商业利益集团的偏好相符，他们也未能掌控局面。这或许是因为普京始终不肯让特朗普达成协议。这也反映出，每当万斯及其同僚似乎越界时，首要主义阵营和欧洲势力都会试图重新定义谈判条款。截至撰写本文时，尽管美俄乌三国之间已经举行了一系列直接会谈， 但这种局面仍未见好转的迹象。

All the factions have thus lost one way or another. Lest they appear disloyal, however, all of them adapt their rhetoric to appear in sync with the president (and their base). Rubio reframes Trump’s territorial claims on Greenland in reference to America’s security interests, while leaning on prioritiser arguments to disguise his beliefs about American retrenchment in Europe. Vance, having lost out to the primacists on Iran and Venezuela, makes it all about homeland security and quick, surgical strikes—a far cry from the forever wars of the past. The factions unite in their praise for Trump as a strong leader and their disgust with European “weakness”. The national defence and security strategies reflect this private bargaining and public loyalty: the documents reconcile cross-factional compromise via ambiguity and transactionalism, offering post hoc justifications for the president’s impulses. They may, in turn, end up telling us more about the first year of Trump’s presidency than they do the next three.

因此，所有派系都以某种方式败北了。然而，为了避免显得不忠，他们都调整了措辞，以示与总统（及其支持者）的立场一致。卢比奥将特朗普对格陵兰岛的领土主张重新定义为美国的国家安全利益，同时利用优先论调来掩盖其对美国在欧洲撤军的看法。万斯在伊朗和委内瑞拉问题上败给了优先论者，于是将重点放在国土安全和快速精准打击上——这与过去旷日持久的战争截然不同。各派系在赞扬特朗普是一位强有力的领导人以及对欧洲“软弱”的厌恶上达成了一致。国家国防和安全战略反映了这种私下讨价还价和公开忠诚：这些文件通过含糊其辞和交易主义来调和跨派系妥协，为总统的冲动提供了事后辩解。反过来，这些文件最终可能更多地反映了特朗普总统任期的第一年，而不是接下来的三年。

Even America  甚至美国

This has significant implications for America’s global power. Before Trump took office, prioritisers argued the main trade-offs involved in the pivot to the Indo-Pacific would be between US presence in Europe and in the Middle East. Sure enough, the first year of Trump’s second term saw US military resources shift from one theatre to another. But it was from the Indo-Pacific and Europe towards Trump’s performative adventures in the Middle East and the western hemisphere.

这对美国的全球实力有着重大影响。在特朗普上任之前，一些专家认为， 转向印太战略的主要权衡取舍在于美国在欧洲和中东的存在。果不其然，特朗普第二个任期的第一年，美国的军事资源确实从一个战场转移到了另一个战场。但这次的转移方向是从印太地区和欧洲，转向了特朗普在中东和西半球的作秀式军事行动。

Some of that reallocation fulfils the longstanding restrainer demands to surge troops to the border with Mexico. In the first two months of 2025 alone, the administration reportedly spent $328m on Trump’s border deployments. This would amount to a cumulative annual cost of $2bn if it continued at the same rate. But the Pentagon’s requested budget for 2026 reportedly earmarks $5bn more for the southern border in 2026. (For context, America’s annual military aid to Israel was roughly $3.8bn in the pre-October 2023 era.) Trump has also turned his show of strength on Democrat-led cities. This militarisation is transforming one of the world’s most durable republics from within, at a cost of almost $500m to the taxpayer over 2025.

部分重新分配的资金满足了长期以来克制派要求向美墨边境增兵的呼声。据报道，仅在 2025 年的前两个月，特朗普政府就花费了 3.28 亿美元用于边境部署。如果继续以同样的速度推进，这将使年度累计成本达到 20 亿美元。但据报道，五角大楼 2026 年的预算申请中，还为南部边境额外拨款 50 亿美元。（作为参考，在 2023 年 10 月之前，美国每年对以色列的军事援助约为 38 亿美元 。）特朗普还将武力展示的矛头指向了民主党执政的城市。这种军事化正在从内部改变世界上最稳定的共和国之一，预计到 2025 年将耗费纳税人近 5 亿美元 。

All this has happened without the concurrent overseas retrenchment restrainers argue is necessary. The president’s Caribbean operations are costing the administration around $31m a day. One report suggested a cumulative total of $700m by January 8th, rising by $9m a day. The administration spent over $1bn in its two-month naval and air campaign against the Houthis yet failed to eliminate the threat. The non-partisanTaxpayers for Common Senseestimates the Iran strikes cost between $100m and $132m in a single night. But underwriting Israel’s defence during the 12-day war was a much greater drain: in 2025, America spent roughly as much defending Israel as it provided in direct annual aid, once missile interceptors fired during the Iran conflict are counted. As the Wall Street Journal reported in July, the US deployed two of its seven most advanced missile defence systems to Israel and fired more than 150 interceptors in under two weeks. This was nearly a quarter of such missiles ever purchased by the Pentagon; it will likely take until summer 2026 to replenish them and cost $2bn.

所有这一切都发生在没有同时进行海外紧缩措施的情况下，而这些紧缩措施正是那些反对者所认为的必要之举。总统在加勒比海的军事行动每天耗费政府约 3100 万美元。一份报告显示， 截至 1 月 8 日，累计耗资已达 7 亿美元，并且每天还在以 900 万美元的速度增长。政府在为期两个月的针对胡塞武装的海空行动中花费了超过 10 亿美元，却未能消除威胁。无党派组织“纳税人常识”（Taxpayers for Common Sense） 估计， 对伊朗的空袭仅一夜就耗资 1 亿至 1.32 亿美元。但在为期 12 天的战争期间，为以色列的国防提供资金的消耗要大得多：到 2025 年，如果将伊朗冲突期间发射的导弹拦截器计算在内，美国在以色列防务上的支出大致相当于其每年提供的直接援助。正如《 华尔街日报》 7 月份报道的那样 ，美国向以色列部署了其七套最先进的导弹防御系统中的两套，并在不到两周的时间内发射了 150 多枚拦截器。这几乎占五角大楼此类导弹采购总量的四分之一 ；补充这些储量可能要到 2026 年夏季才能完成，耗资 20 亿美元。

These may seem like trivial amounts for a country whose military spending has long dwarfed that of the rest of the world. But the administration’s burst of military activity in 2025 and early 2026 left the Pentagon scrambling to shuttle aircraft carriers between theatres and reassign weapons systems. Restrainers have long complained that Ukraine burned through high-end munitions at a pace that outstripped production. The administration has now repeated that trick in the Middle East. Assets the US might need to deter China are spread thinly, seemingly without consideration of what that means for America’s place in the world. The retrenchment from Europe, if it happens, itself undermines America’s ability to project its power elsewhere.

对于一个军费开支长期以来远超世界其他国家的国家而言，这些数字或许看似微不足道。但美国政府在2025年和2026年初的军事行动激增，使得五角大楼不得不紧急调配航母往返于各个战区，并重新分配武器系统。长期以来，一些批评人士一直抱怨乌克兰消耗高端弹药的速度超过了其生产能力。如今，美国政府在中东故技重施。美国可能需要用来威慑中国的资源被分散部署，似乎完全没有考虑到这会对美国在世界上的地位造成怎样的影响。如果美国真的从欧洲撤军，其本身就会削弱美国在其他地区投射力量的能力。

But most of all, Europe

但最重要的是，欧洲

The implications for Europe are clear. For decades, Trump has said he thinks allies are ripping America off in security alliances. He pushed for bigger contributions from European NATO members throughout his first term. In 2025, the administration again spelled out the burden-shifting imperative in the national security strategy: the US expects Europe to assume primary responsibility for its own security, while offering continued access to US markets, technology, and defence cooperation as inducements rather than guarantees. The national defence strategy repeats it once again in a “line of effort” all of its own.

这对欧洲的影响显而易见。几十年来，特朗普一直认为盟友在安全联盟中占美国的便宜。在他的第一个任期内，他一直敦促欧洲北约成员国做出更大的贡献。2025 年，特朗普政府在国家安全战略中再次明确了责任转移的必要性：美国希望欧洲承担起自身安全的主要责任，同时继续提供美国市场、技术和防务合作，但这仅仅是诱因，而非保证。国家防务战略在其自身的“行动路线”中再次重申了这一点。

It is now an accepted fact that Europeans need to assume financial responsibility for Ukraine. The leaders of European NATO members have committed to 5% military spending targets (except Spain). They have also earmarked over $4bn in PURL purchases for Ukraine. Less obvious is whether America can fulfil these purchases, given the strain on its attention and resources. Trump also took things a step further with his claims on Greenland’s territory. This involved threatening Denmark, one of America’s most loyal European NATO allies. As my ECFR colleagues argued in January, Europeans must now work out not only how to defend their continent with less America, but also against America. The “framework for a future deal” announced in Davos should come as no reassurance, given Trump’s long history of welching and using such agreements as leverage.

如今，欧洲人必须承担起乌克兰的财政责任已是公认的事实。除西班牙外，欧洲北约成员国的领导人已承诺将军费开支削减至 5%。他们还为乌克兰预留了超过 40 亿美元的优先采购额。鉴于美国目前面临的资源和精力压力，它能否履行这些采购承诺尚不明朗。特朗普对格陵兰岛领土的主张更是将事态推向了新的高度。这甚至威胁到了丹麦——美国最忠诚的欧洲北约盟友之一。正如我的欧洲对外关系委员会（ECFR）同事在 1 月份所指出的 ，欧洲人现在不仅要思考如何在美国影响力减弱的情况下保卫自己的大陆，还要思考如何抵御美国的威胁。鉴于特朗普长期以来屡次违约并利用此类协议作为筹码，在达沃斯宣布的“未来协议框架”不应令人感到安心。

Part of Europe’s defence will have to be against Trumpists’ culture war. Both Trump administrations have shown remarkable consistency in their support for far-right populists in Europe. The second administration laid bare its affinity with these “civilisational allies” yet again in the national security strategy. Part of this seems to stem from Trumpists’ business agenda: by empowering Eurosceptics, Trumpists’ likely aim to weaken the bloc’s capacity to regulate US tech companies, maintain unity in trade negotiations and potentially resist US pressure to lift sanctions on Russia.

欧洲防御的一部分必须针对特朗普主义者发起的文化战争 。两届特朗普政府都表现出惊人的一致性，支持欧洲的极右翼民粹主义者。第二届政府在国家安全战略中再次暴露了其与这些“文明盟友”的密切关系。这部分原因似乎源于特朗普主义者的商业议程：通过赋予疑欧派权力，特朗普主义者很可能旨在削弱欧盟监管美国科技公司的能力，维护贸易谈判中的团结，并有可能抵制美国解除对俄罗斯制裁的压力。

But there is also a strong ideological component. My colleague Celia Belin has shown how Trumpists’ views of Europe are an extension of their domestic culture war against “liberal leftists”. In this respect, conservative, Christian strongmen (Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, his Slovakian counterpart Robert Fico, or even Putin himself) find themselves on the right side of the divide. Translated into foreign policy, this ideological aspect conflates with the restrainer desire for a reset with Russia, meaning that direction may become consistent also on Ukraine. In short, there is no “Western response” to Russian aggression, because there is no “West”, as Europeans have understood it in the post-second world war era.

但其中也包含着强烈的意识形态因素。我的同事西莉亚·贝林指出， 特朗普主义者对欧洲的看法是他们国内针对“自由左派”的文化战争的延伸。在这方面，保守的基督教强人（匈牙利总理维克托·欧尔班、斯洛伐克总理罗伯特·菲佐，甚至普京本人）都站在了正确的一边。在外交政策层面，这种意识形态因素与克制地希望与俄罗斯重启关系的愿望相融合，这意味着在乌克兰问题上，他们的立场也可能保持一致。简而言之，对于俄罗斯的侵略行为，不存在所谓的“西方回应”，因为“西方”的概念已经不复存在，不再像二战后欧洲人所理解的那样。

What to do when the West goes west

当西方西进时该怎么办？

“My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.” (Donald Trump, interview with the New York Times, January 2026)

“ 只有我自己的道德准则，我自己的思想，才能阻止我。” （唐纳德·特朗普，2026 年 1 月接受《 纽约时报 》 采访 ）

The coming years look daunting for Europe’s leaders. Their once great ally has no grand strategy or coherent ideological direction to, for better or worse, at least make their lives more predictable. Trump himself seems to be driven by short-term fixations and long-term grudges, which have little to do with America’s place in the world now or after he has gone. He lends his ear to a few aides in the Oval Office and a handful of billionaires and strongmen outside it. He has gutted the federal government, slashing the agencies that in previous administrations vetted and filtered the policy options that reached the president. If they can get his attention, the factions compete to serve him up quick wins; if something is his idea, the absence of the interagency process means there’s little they can do to stop him.

未来几年对欧洲领导人来说充满挑战。他们曾经的强大盟友既没有宏大的战略，也没有连贯的意识形态方向，无论好坏，至少都无法让他们的生活更有可预测性。特朗普本人似乎被短期利益和长期积怨所驱使，这与美国现在或他卸任后的世界地位几乎毫无关系。他只听取椭圆形办公室里少数几位助手的意见，以及办公室外少数亿万富翁和强人的意见。他大幅削减了联邦政府的预算，砍掉了那些在前几届政府中负责审查和筛选提交给总统的政策选项的机构。如果能引起他的注意，各派势力就会竞相为他提供快速见效的方案；如果某件事是他自己的想法，由于缺乏跨部门的协商程序，他们几乎无力阻止他。

One constant in all this is the president’s desire to win, whether this is through foreign policy victories, extractive deals and shows of strength. The details are irrelevant. Another is the convergence of the factions on the question of “Europe”. Regardless of which faction temporarily satisfies Trump, everyone agrees US attention should shift away from European security. Washington increasingly treats Europeans less as allies and more as prey. And, whatever pledges Rubio and the primacist whisperers get to, say, keep US troops in Europe, the reality is that these troops belong to a changed America, one whose leadership does not define US interests and priorities in the same way as most European countries. Trump’s apparent determination to acquire Greenland and threats against Denmark are the most glaring example of this divergence. His militarisation of the homeland is another.

所有这一切中不变的是总统的求胜欲望，无论这种欲望是通过外交政策的胜利、资源掠夺交易还是武力展示来实现。细节无关紧要。另一个不变的是各派在“欧洲”问题上的共识。无论哪个派系暂时满足了特朗普的诉求，所有人都同意美国的注意力应该从欧洲安全转移开来。华盛顿越来越把欧洲人视为猎物而非盟友。而且，无论卢比奥和那些主张欧洲一体化的幕后推手做出怎样的承诺，比如保证美军继续驻扎在欧洲，现实情况是，这些军队隶属于一个已经改变的美国，这个国家的领导层对美国利益和优先事项的定义与大多数欧洲国家截然不同。特朗普显然决心吞并格陵兰岛以及对丹麦的威胁，就是这种分歧最明显的例证。他对本土的军事化也是另一个例证。

In 2025 Europeans mainly tiptoed around this new reality, out of necessity as much as naivety. Rutte, Stubb, Merz and others mixed flattery and persuasion with purchases of US weapons and liquefied natural gas. They proposed edits to US positions and plans. Crucially, they also ducked public confrontation with Trump and dodged overt alignment with Democrats. This achieved small temporary reversals of the administration’s more alarming propositions. But it also created a cycle in which Trump returns quickly with new, more extreme proposals: territorial grabs in the Arctic, more tariffs, more insults. Each escalation feels more shocking than the last. Yet Europeans remain locked in reactive mode because their structural relationship with America has not changed. Europe remains dependent on America for security, while Russia wages a full-blown war next door. Trumpists thus always have the upper hand.

到了2025年，欧洲人大多小心翼翼地应对着这一新现实，这既是出于无奈，也是出于天真。吕特、斯图布、默茨等人一边奉承劝说，一边购买美国武器和液化天然气。他们提议修改美国的立场和计划。至关重要的是，他们还避免与特朗普公开对抗，也避免与民主党公开结盟。这在一定程度上暂时扭转了特朗普政府一些更令人担忧的提议。但这同时也形成了一个恶性循环：特朗普会迅速带着新的、更极端的提议卷土重来——在北极攫取领土、提高关税、进行更多侮辱。每一次升级都比上一次更令人震惊。然而，欧洲人仍然处于被动应对的状态，因为他们与美国的结构性关系并没有改变。欧洲的安全仍然依赖于美国，而俄罗斯却在邻国发动全面战争。因此，特朗普的支持者始终占据上风。

Even in the aftermath of the Greenland crisis, European officials and diplomats are still grappling with the question of who to listen to when it comes to the Trump administration. In Davos, the Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent warned against over-reacting to Trump’s territorial claims and escalating the situation. The Democratic governor of California Gavin Newsom told Europeans to start showing Trump the strength he respects and hit back. But Europe’s choices in dealing with the Trump administration and its implications for the world do not have to be either or. They can and should be both at once. 

即使在格陵兰危机之后，欧洲官员和外交官仍在努力应对一个问题：在面对特朗普政府时，究竟应该听谁的？在达沃斯，美国财政部长斯科特·贝森特警告不要对特朗普的领土主张反应过度，以免局势升级。加州民主党州长加文·纽森则呼吁欧洲人展现出特朗普所应有的实力，予以反击。然而，欧洲在应对特朗普政府及其对世界的影响时，并非只能二选一，而是可以而且应该两者兼顾。

Three steps in the right direction

朝着正确方向迈出的三步

Newsom is right: Trump only respects strength. But Europe’s security dependence on the US means the former does not have the luxury of an open rupture. Europeans will have to keep using flattery to buy time to address the structural imbalance. Yet Trumpists would not be attacking Europe so brutally if the continent did not have some things one or another of the factions wants. To introduce “more Newsom” to the relationship, Europeans need to identify what these things are and learn to use them. They should also use their leverage to defend themselves against Trumpist assaults in the security, economic and cultural realms. What Europeans should not do is hope the US will revert to its old responsibilities in the global order. They should instead have the confidence to take advantage of America’s diminishing global power to reassert some of their own. Realism is essential. But China is not the only power capable of filling the holes left by the US.

纽瑟姆说得对：特朗普只尊重实力。但欧洲对美国的安全依赖意味着，欧洲没有公开决裂的余地。欧洲人不得不继续奉承美国，以此争取时间来解决结构性失衡问题。然而，如果欧洲大陆没有某些东西是某些派系所渴望的，特朗普的支持者就不会如此残酷地攻击欧洲。为了让美欧关系“更像纽瑟姆那样”，欧洲人需要明确这些渴望是什么，并学会利用它们。他们还应该利用自身的影响力，在安全、经济和文化领域抵御特朗普的攻击。欧洲人不应该指望美国会恢复其在全球秩序中原有的责任。相反，他们应该有信心利用美国全球影响力的下降，重新确立自身的一些地位。务实至关重要。但中国并非唯一能够填补美国留下的空白的力量。

The following three steps would be a good place for Europeans to start.

以下三个步骤对于欧洲人来说是一个不错的起点。

Rewrite the rules  重写规则

As I argued in Foreign Policy in December, the EU and European countries need to set clear expectations for America. “Red lines” tend to fade in sunlight, but Europeans should restate them nonetheless on Greenland and Ukraine and then stick to them. They should also ensure the administration knows US interference in European domestic politics is one such line.

正如我去年 12 月在 《外交政策》杂志上所论述的 ， 欧盟和欧洲国家需要向美国明确提出预期 。“红线”往往会在阳光下褪色，但欧洲人仍然应该在格陵兰岛和乌克兰问题上重申这些红线，并坚持到底。他们还应该让美国政府明白，美国干涉欧洲内政也是一条红线。

European leaders must not allow themselves to be manipulated into bilateral negotiations with America. The European Commission holds full competence on digital policy and should be forceful with that authority, for instance, by using (if necessary) its anti-coercion instrument. This would allow the EU to implement various forms of economic retaliation, including tariffs, export controls and procurement restrictions. But coordination through formal EU structures is a fantasy on such issues as Ukraine, Russia sanctions and even Greenland. This is because the unanimity requirement allows individual member states to act as spoilers. 

欧洲领导人绝不能被美国操纵，陷入双边谈判 。欧盟委员会在数字政策方面拥有完全的管辖权，应当有力地行使这一权力，例如，必要时动用其反胁迫机制 。这将使欧盟能够实施各种形式的经济报复措施，包括关税、出口管制和采购限制。但在乌克兰、俄罗斯制裁乃至格陵兰岛等问题上，通过欧盟正式机构进行协调是天方夜谭。这是因为一致同意的要求使得个别成员国可以充当破坏者。

Instead, Europeans should work through an informal coalition of member states and like-minded partners. Members of this coalition should share a common agenda and have assets that can become leverage. The group is already taking shape: the leaders of Germany, Finland, France, and the UK have long coordinated their Trump diplomacy. They should now welcome Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway (and Canada) to the fold. These countries have already come together in support of Denmark on Greenland. But they need to go beyond symbolic troop deployments. Now they need to arm themselves with a much stronger combination of assets and capabilities, and be ready to use them.

相反，欧洲人应该通过成员国和志同道合的伙伴组成一个非正式联盟来开展工作 。该联盟的成员应该拥有共同的目标，并具备可以转化为筹码的资源。这个联盟已经开始成形：德国、芬兰、法国和英国的领导人长期以来一直在协调应对特朗普的外交政策。他们现在应该欢迎丹麦、荷兰、挪威（以及加拿大）加入。这些国家已经在格陵兰岛问题上团结起来支持丹麦。但他们需要做的不仅仅是象征性的军队部署。现在，他们需要武装自己，拥有更强大的资源和能力组合，并做好随时使用它们的准备。

Audit Europe’s assets  审计欧洲的资产

I also argued in December that Europeans need a comprehensive checklist of assets Trump’s America values and does not want to lose. Member states and other coalition members should conduct their own audits. But this should extend into the EU single market, which is one of the world’s largest for US tech firms, agribusiness, services and digital platforms. Washington depends on Europe in many other areas, including some European companies’ role in advanced manufacturing (for instance of microchips) and critical technology supply chains. In early 2025, my ECFR colleague Tobias Gehrke published a breakdown of the EU’s economic “cards” across trade, technology, infrastructure, finance and people-to-people relations.

我在去年 12 月也曾指出， 欧洲人需要一份全面的资产清单，列出特朗普治下的美国所珍视且不愿失去的资产。成员国和其他联盟成员应该进行各自的审计。但这应该延伸到欧盟单一市场，因为欧盟单一市场是美国科技公司、农业综合企业、服务和数字平台在全球最大的市场之一。华盛顿在许多其他领域也依赖欧洲，包括一些欧洲公司在先进制造业（例如微芯片）和关键技术供应链中的作用。2025 年初，我的欧洲对外关系委员会同事托比亚斯·格尔克发表了一份关于欧盟在贸易、技术、基础设施、金融和人文交流等方面的经济“王牌”分析报告。

The coalition should aim to build on this and extend it to other areas where Europeans hold specific assets that can be turned into leverage. For instance, European investors jointly hold approximately $3.6trn in US treasuries. At the end of January, Denmark’s Pensions Fund announced it was selling its $100m holding of US government bonds. This alone was likely not decisive in triggering Trump’s “framework of a future deal” for Greenland. But it demonstrated how Trump’s volatile behaviour can affect the value of US bonds, and investors’ decisions along with them. Moreover, taxing and regulatory power over US services is a source of European leverage. This is because balance in US-EU trade in services tilted decisively in America’s favour last year, with the EU buying roughly $300bn from the US while selling back only about $200bn. Finally, the EU controls most frozen Russian sovereign assets and the legal mechanisms needed to use their windfall profits. The US therefore cannot “bring Russia in from the cold” without favourable European legal decisions and financial resources.

该联盟应以此为基础，并将其扩展到欧洲人持有可转化为杠杆的特定资产的其他领域 。例如，欧洲投资者共同持有约 3.6 万亿美元的美国国债。1 月底，丹麦养老基金宣布出售其持有的价值 1 亿美元的美国政府债券。仅此一项可能不足以促成特朗普提出的格陵兰岛“未来协议框架”。但这表明，特朗普反复无常的行为会如何影响美国债券的价值，以及投资者的决策。此外，对美国服务业的税收和监管权力也是欧洲的杠杆来源。这是因为去年美欧服务贸易的平衡明显向美国倾斜，欧盟从美国购买了约 3000 亿美元的服务，而仅向美国出售了约 2000 亿美元。最后，欧盟控制着大部分被冻结的俄罗斯主权资产以及利用这些资产带来的意外收益所需的法律机制。因此，如果没有欧洲的有利法律判决和财政资源，美国就无法“让俄罗斯摆脱困境”。

Prove strength exists in pluralism

证明多元主义蕴含力量

As “the father of realism” Hans Morgenthau explained all those years ago, political power is above all a psychological relation. For Europeans to effectively exercise political power, they need to get better at playing the psychological game. This means adding threats to their repertoire of flattery and persuasion. And if one good thing comes from the cacophony of actors, leaders, institutions and languages in the EU, member states and their allies, it is that enough of them exist to divide up the tasks that lie ahead.

正如“现实主义之父”汉斯·摩根索多年前所阐述的那样，政治权力首先是一种心理关系。欧洲人要想有效行使政治权力，就必须更擅长玩转心理战。这意味着，除了奉承和劝说之外，他们还需要增加威胁手段。欧盟、成员国及其盟友中形形色色的行动者、领导人、机构和语言，如果说其中有什么好处的话，那就是它们的数量足够多，可以分工合作，共同应对未来的挑战。

Rutte, Stubb, Starmer and other “friends” of Trump should continue their personal diplomacy with the president. But Trump needs to believe his friends in Europe are holding back a more punitive response. This means some coalition members should become “frenemies”, ready to threaten the US and play their cards without hesitation if lines are crossed. Friends should do the ego work. Frenemies should make credible threats. Who takes on which role should sometimes surprise the administration. This is the only way Europeans can escape the cycle of flattery and reactivity to America’s strategy of non-strategy.

鲁特、斯塔布、斯塔默和其他特朗普的“朋友”应该继续与总统进行私人外交。但特朗普需要相信他在欧洲的朋友们不会采取更严厉的惩罚措施。 这意味着一些联盟成员应该变成“亦敌亦友”，一旦美国越界，他们就准备好威胁美国，毫不犹豫地出手 。朋友应该维护美国颜面，而“亦敌亦友”则应该发出可信的威胁。谁扮演哪个角色，有时应该让美国政府感到意外。这是欧洲人摆脱对美国“无战略”策略的奉承和被动反应循环的唯一途径。

Threats should imply real costs for the US. But they should also include clear ways for the administration to fold. The cooling of Trump’s rhetoric on Greenland is a good example. The volatile reaction of the bond markets was likely more decisive that anything Rutte put on the table. The secretary-general certainly did not offer Trump anything Europeans had not offered before. Rutte rather gave Trump a “deal” to use as a face-saving measure as he calmed the markets.

威胁应当意味着美国要付出实际代价，但也应包含政府可以妥协的明确途径。 特朗普在格陵兰问题上缓和的言辞就是一个很好的例子。债券市场的剧烈反应可能比吕特提出的任何方案都更具决定性。这位秘书长当然没有向特朗普提供任何欧洲人以前没有提供的方案。吕特只是给了特朗普一份“协议”，让他以此作为挽回颜面、安抚市场的手段。

Europeans should also appeal to the different factions and generate incentives for each of them to take Europe seriously as a power and as a partner for their pet projects. European diplomats in Washington need to get better at connecting with the different factions in the executive branch. So far they have focused on primacists: by working exclusively with team Rubio on Ukraine, they have mostly tried to circumvent the restrainers and the prioritisers. But Europeans need to recognise they have allies in the restrainer camp when it comes to curbing Trump’s territorial appetites on Greenland and preventing potentially escalatory military adventures in Middle East.  

欧洲人也应该呼吁各方努力，并激励他们认真对待欧洲这一力量，将其视为各自重点项目的合作伙伴 。驻华盛顿的欧洲外交官需要更好地与行政部门的不同派系沟通。迄今为止，他们主要关注的是优先派：通过在乌克兰问题上只与卢比奥团队合作，他们基本上是在试图绕过那些持克制立场和优先考虑原则的人。但欧洲人需要认识到，在遏制特朗普对格陵兰岛的领土野心以及防止中东地区可能发生的军事行动升级方面，他们在克制派阵营中拥有盟友。

On Greenland specifically, Europeans should plug into the US domestic debate. My ECFR colleagues have explained how Europeans should raise the domestic political costs of Greenland acquisition. Their advice includes:

具体到格陵兰问题，欧洲人应该参与到美国的国内辩论中来。 我的欧洲对外关系委员会（ECFR）同事们已经阐述了欧洲人应该如何提高美国收购格陵兰的国内政治成本。他们的建议包括：

Engaging with Congress to provoke discussions about the limits of blunt assertions of power. Denmark has done this well already and should be joined consistently by other traditional American partners and allies.

与国会互动，引发关于武力滥用界限的讨论。丹麦在这方面已经做得很好，其他美国传统伙伴和盟友也应该持续效仿。

Involving themselves in the US media and think-tank debate about Greenland, including spreading knowledge about actual Greenlandic public opinion, to expose the administration’s misrepresentations.

他们参与美国媒体和智库关于格陵兰的辩论，包括传播有关格陵兰公众真实想法的知识，以揭露政府的歪曲事实。

In following this advice, Europeans should aim to validate the core domestic arguments of both restrainersand primacists. They should focus on the expense (restrainers), the damage to the alliance (primacists), and limited immediate payoff (long-term wins do not interest Trump). In so doing, Europeans could help steer the outcome towards cooperation and away from continued US insistence on a land grab. Europeans should also use this technique to influence the factions when it comes to the Middle East, where domestic costs may be just as high due to the great symbolism of Iraq for the MAGA base.

遵循这些建议，欧洲人应力图验证克制派和优先派各自的核心国内论点 。他们应着重强调代价（克制派）、对联盟的损害（优先派）以及有限的短期收益（特朗普对长期利益并不感兴趣）。如此一来，欧洲人便能引导事态朝着合作的方向发展，避免美国继续坚持侵占领土。在中东问题上，欧洲人也应运用此策略影响各方势力，因为伊拉克对“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）支持者而言具有重要的象征意义，其国内代价可能同样高昂。

Europeans should also deploy their diversity to introduce more strategic confusion and plausible deniability into their relationship with America. They should use all the languages, literal and metaphorical, they have available to them to talk to one other and issue public statements. This would enable them to use linguistic dominance over the US to reframe and reinterpret their positions when needed. For instance, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni used her native language to talk to Italian journalists during a meeting with US President Trump in the Oval Office, introducing a degree of ambiguity in the conversation which allowed her to say one thing to the domestic audience and then slightly reinterpret it when Trump asked for translation. In short, Europeans and their allies should aim to show America more of their strength but less of their working.

欧洲人也应该利用自身的多样性，在与美国的关系中制造更多战略上的混乱和似是而非的否认 。他们应该运用所有可用的语言，包括字面意义和比喻意义上的语言，进行彼此交流并发表公开声明。这将使他们能够利用对美国的语言优势，在必要时重新构建和诠释自身的立场。例如，意大利总理乔治娅·梅洛尼在椭圆形办公室与美国总统特朗普会晤期间，就用母语与意大利记者交谈，这在对话中制造了一定程度的模糊性，使她能够对国内民众表达一种观点，然后在特朗普要求翻译时稍作修改。简而言之， 欧洲及其盟友应该力求向美国展现更多实力，而非过多地暴露其运作方式。

Finally, “Europe” needs a coherent public narrative to counter US political interference conducted through support for far-right parties. The Trump administration often frames its attacks on the EU in the language of civilisational threat and culture wars. But the reality is that commercial interests play a big role in driving the administrations’ anti-EU agenda. Silicon Valley tech giants see Brussels as a major threat to their business models. At a time when the Trump administration is pushing to fully deregulate AI companies in the US, the EU and its member states retain the commitment and capacity to regulate big tech. Europe’s leaders should therefore talk to European people. Instead of waging a culture war with Washington or with the far right, European leaders must highlight the commercial motivations underpinning the Trump administration’s attacks on Europe.

最后，“ 欧洲”需要一个连贯的公共叙事来对抗美国通过支持极右翼政党进行的政治干预 。特朗普政府经常以文明威胁和文化战争的论调来攻击欧盟。但现实是，商业利益在推动美国政府的反欧盟议程中扮演着重要角色。硅谷科技巨头将布鲁塞尔视为其商业模式的重大威胁。在特朗普政府力推全面放松美国人工智能公司监管之际，欧盟及其成员国仍然有能力和决心对大型科技公司进行监管。因此，欧洲领导人应该与欧洲民众对话。 欧洲领导人不应与华盛顿或极右翼势力进行文化战争，而应着重强调特朗普政府攻击欧洲背后的商业动机 。

A world not long for this world

一个即将消逝的世界

So far, Europeans have coped with Trump and his administration as well as they could. But Trump seems much more responsive to the strategies of countries like China that immediately impose costs on the US in response to his disruptive policies. Europeans must now combine their tactics for “keeping America in” with a strategy to defend themselves against the US, using their leverage to stand up to Trump and his administration when they threaten European interests or indeed European territory.

迄今为止，欧洲人已经尽力应对特朗普及其政府。但特朗普似乎更容易受到中国等国策略的影响，这些国家会立即对其破坏性政策采取反制措施，让美国付出代价。如今，欧洲人必须将“留住美国”的策略与防御美国的策略结合起来，利用自身的影响力，在特朗普及其政府威胁欧洲利益乃至领土时予以坚决抵制。

But they should also keep an eye on the longer term. Trump’s America is showing the world that it is policy, not only cash, that defines capabilities. This applies to European power, too. If “Europe” does not know what it wants to do without America, no amount of military spending will turn it into an equal partner. European objectives can remain derivative of American policy only in a world where these two converge. And that world seems not long for this world.

但他们也应该着眼长远。特朗普时代的美国正在向世界表明，决定实力的是政策，而不仅仅是资金。这一点同样适用于欧洲的实力。如果“欧洲”不知道在没有美国的情况下该何去何从，那么再多的军费开支也无法使其成为平等的伙伴。只有在美欧政策趋于一致的世界里，欧洲的目标才能继续依附于美国政策。而这样的世界似乎不会长久。

About the author  关于作者

Dr Majda Ruge is a senior policy fellow with the US programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Berlin. Her areas of focus include US foreign policy and transatlantic relations, as well as the Western Balkans. Most recently, she has written and published on the foreign policy debates in the Republican party and the impact of domestic polarisation on the US foreign policy and the transatlantic alliance.

玛伊达·鲁格博士是欧洲对外关系委员会美国项目的高级政策研究员，常驻柏林。她的研究领域包括美国外交政策、跨大西洋关系以及西巴尔干地区。近期，她撰写并发表了关于共和党内部外交政策辩论以及国内两极分化对美国外交政策和跨大西洋联盟影响的文章。

Before joining ECFR, Ruge spent three years at the Foreign Policy Institute/SAIS at the Johns Hopkins University. She has twice testified as an expert witness at hearings of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Balkans. From 2014 to 2016, she lived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where she was associated with the Gulf Research Center. Between 2012 and 2014, she was a post-doctoral fellow and lecturer at the Otto-Suhr-Institute of the Free University of Berlin, where she taught courses on international relations and nationalism.

加入欧洲对外关系委员会之前，鲁格曾在约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院/外交政策研究所工作三年。她曾两次作为专家证人出席美国参议院外交关系委员会关于西巴尔干地区的听证会。2014年至2016年，她居住在沙特阿拉伯利雅得，并曾就职于海湾研究中心。2012年至2014年，她担任柏林自由大学奥托·苏尔研究所的博士后研究员和讲师，教授国际关系和民族主义课程。

Acknowledgments  致谢

I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Kim Butson, the editor every policy fellow dreams of. She vastly improved this brief and grasped every argument and nuance so thoroughly that working with her felt like co-authoring. I am equally indebted to Jeremy Shapiro for the inspiration he has provided over the past years for my work on US foreign policy, including for this policy brief through his writing on factionalism. I am also grateful to Mikhael Komin and Joanna Hosa, whose paper on Russia in the Arctic inspired the “market of wins” terminology, and Nastassia Zenovich, for her work on the profiles in this paper. Finally, my sincere thanks to the many contacts and friends in Washington from across the foreign policy tribes for helping me understand the contours of Republican debates over the past four years. None of these individuals bear any responsibility whatsoever for any errors.

我衷心感谢金·巴特森（Kim Butson），她是每位政策研究员梦寐以求的编辑。她极大地提升了这份简报的质量，对每一个论点和细微之处都把握得如此透彻，与她合作就像是共同撰写一样。我同样感谢杰里米·夏皮罗（Jeremy Shapiro），过去几年里，他为我研究美国外交政策提供了诸多灵感，包括他关于派系斗争的文章，也为这份政策简报的撰写提供了启发。我还要感谢米哈伊尔·科明（Mikhael Komin）和乔安娜·霍萨（Joanna Hosa），他们关于俄罗斯在北极的论文启发了“胜利市场”这一术语的提出；以及娜塔莎·泽诺维奇（Nastassia Zenovich），感谢她为本文撰写的人物简介。最后，我真诚地感谢华盛顿各界外交政策人士的众多联系人和朋友，感谢他们帮助我理解过去四年共和党辩论的脉络 。以上人员均不对本文中的任何错误承担任何责任。

[1] Author’s conversation with former Pentagon official, January 2026.

[1] 作者与前五角大楼官员的对话，2026 年 1 月。

[2] Author’s conversations with restrainers and former administration officials, Brussels, June 2025.

[2] 作者与限制者和前政府官员的对话，布鲁塞尔，2025 年 6 月。

[3] Author’s interview with former administration officials, May and June 2025.

[3] 作者于 2025 年 5 月和 6 月采访了前政府官员。

[4] Author’s conversations with former administration officials, June 2025.

[4] 作者与前政府官员的对话，2025 年 6 月。

[5] Author’s interview with senior European official, Berlin, September 2025.

[5] 作者于 2025 年 9 月在柏林采访了一位欧洲高级官员。

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

欧洲对外关系委员会不采取集体立场。其出版物仅代表作者个人观点。