美国的财政前景是灾难性的，但却被遗忘了

经济学人：

It was not so long ago that the hottest topic in American politics was the ballooning national debt. In 1992 Ross Perot had the best showing for a third-party candidate in a presidential election since 1912 on a platform of fiscal probity. Two years later the Republicans seized control of Congress for the first time in 40 years, with the first item in their “Contract with America” being a pledge to balance the budget. Bill Clinton easily won re-election two years after that, in part by negotiating spending cuts with Republicans that led to America’s first surpluses in a generation.

不久前，美国政坛最热门的话题还是不断膨胀的国债。 1992 年，罗斯 · 佩罗 (Ross Perot) 在总统选举中以财政廉洁为主题，取得了自 1912 年以来第三方候选人中的最佳表现。两年后，共和党四十年来首次控制了国会，其《美国契约》中的第一项就是平衡预算的承诺。两年后，比尔 · 克林顿轻松赢得连任，部分原因是与共和党谈判削减开支，导致美国在一代人中首次实现盈余。

At the start of this fiscal hullabaloo, in 1992, America’s net debt amounted to 46% of GDP. Today it has reached 96% of GDP. For the past five years, under first Donald Trump and then Joe Biden, the federal deficit has averaged 9% of GDP a year. The International Monetary Fund says that America’s borrowing is so vast it is endangering global financial stability. S&P and Fitch, two credit-rating agencies, have already downgraded America’s debt; a third, Moody’s, is threatening to.

1992 年，这场财政混乱开始时，美国的净债务达到 GDP 的 46%。如今它已达到 GDP 的 96%。过去五年，先是唐纳德 · 特朗普，然后是乔 · 拜登，联邦赤字平均每年占 GDP 的 9%。国际货币基金组织表示，美国的借贷规模如此之大，正在危及全球金融稳定。标准普尔和惠誉两家信用评级机构已经下调了美国的债务评级；第三家，穆迪公司，正威胁要这么做。

Misgivings mislaid 疑虑被误埋

Yet concern about deficits and debt has all but vanished from American politics. Voters seem relaxed about the subject, which barely registers in pollsters’ tallies of the biggest problems facing the country. Although Messrs Biden and Trump both tut-tut about the dire fiscal outlook from time to time, neither has made improving it a centrepiece of his campaign. On the contrary, both would in all likelihood add to America’s debts, by spending more in Mr Biden’s case and by taxing less in Mr Trump’s. Neither candidate dares breathe a word about trimming spending on health care and pensions for the elderly, which account for the biggest share of the federal budget and are set to grow still bigger as the population ages. Yet a fiscal reckoning is coming, whether the candidates admit it or not—and given the politicians’ denial, it may take an unexpected form.

然而，对赤字和债务的担忧几乎从美国政治中消失了。选民们似乎对这个话题很放松，这个话题几乎没有出现在民意调查机构对该国面临的最大问题的统计中。尽管拜登和特朗普都时不时地对糟糕的财政前景表示不满，但两人都没有将改善财政前景作为他竞选的核心内容。相反，两者都很可能会增加美国的债务，因为拜登的支出增加，而特朗普的税收减少。两位候选人都不敢谈论削减医疗保健和老年人养老金方面的支出，这些支出占联邦预算的最大份额，并且随着人口老龄化而变得越来越大。然而，无论候选人是否承认，财政清算即将到来，而且鉴于政客们的否认，财政清算可能会采取意想不到的形式。

In theory, the two parties could again co-operate to shrink the deficit, as they did in the 1990s. But in those days public opinion was driving politicians to focus on fiscal matters. The deficit regularly ranked among voters’ biggest concerns in opinion polls—the opposite of today.

理论上，两党可以再次合作缩小赤字，就像 20 世纪 90 年代那样。但当时公众舆论正促使政客们关注财政问题。在民意调查中，赤字经常被列为选民最关心的问题——与今天相反。

What is more, circumstance made fiscal discipline easier in the 1990s. Productivity was rising, thanks to the spread of computers and the advent of the internet. Higher growth, in turn, lifted federal revenues. At the same time the government reaped a peace dividend from the end of the Cold War, allowing it to slash defence spending, a relatively painless form of belt-tightening. Nowadays, in contrast, increasing competition with China and Russia may necessitate higher defence spending, not lower. Cutting greenhouse-gas emissions and catering to an ageing population will also strain the budget.

更重要的是，环境因素使得 20 世纪 90 年代的财政纪律变得更加容易。由于计算机的普及和互联网的出现，生产力不断提高。更高的增长反过来又增加了联邦收入。与此同时，政府从冷战结束中获得了和平红利，使其能够削减国防开支，这是一种相对轻松的勒紧腰带的形式。相比之下，如今，与中国和俄罗斯的竞争日益激烈，可能需要更高而不是更低的国防开支。减少温室气体排放和应对人口老龄化也将使预算紧张。

Perhaps worst of all, both parties have concluded that fiscal rectitude does not pay. Mr Clinton’s predecessor, George H.W. Bush, initiated the deficit-cutting of the 1990s by raising taxes, only to be excoriated by the Republican base and lose his re-election bid. Democrats reluctantly accepted the spending cuts of the 1990s, only to see Mr Clinton’s successor and Mr Bush’s son, George W. Bush, fritter away the resulting surplus with a big tax cut.

也许最糟糕的是，双方都得出结论，财政廉洁是没有好处的。克林顿先生的前任乔治 ·H·W· 布什 (George H.W. 布什在 20 世纪 90 年代开始通过增税来削减赤字，结果遭到共和党选民的谴责并失去连任。民主党人不情愿地接受了 20 世纪 90 年代的支出削减，结果却看到克林顿的继任者和布什的儿子乔治 ·W· 布什 (George W. Bush) 通过大幅减税来挥霍由此产生的盈余。

Since then both parties have embraced profligacy. The younger Mr Bush’s tax cuts were largely extended by his successor, Barack Obama, and taken further by Mr Trump. At about 33% of GDP, government revenue is much lower in America than in almost every other rich country. At the same time expenditures have soared, owing both to demographic change and to economic disruptions (the federal government spent lavishly to mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the covid-19 pandemic). “We used to have a healthy fear of debt, and we’ve lost that,” says Keith Hall, a former head of the Congressional Budget Office (cbo), a non-partisan fiscal scorekeeper.

As inhibitions have melted away, America’s fiscal laxity has grown ever more extreme. The 9% average deficit of the past five years is four times bigger than the annual average since the second world war (see chart 1). It is also nearly twice the average for other advanced economies. This extravagance has undoubtedly contributed to the economy’s relative strength today. Democrats are unapologetic about this, especially in the wake of the covid downturn. “We learned from previous recessions that there’s a major cost to the American people in going too small. This time we didn’t do that,” says Bobby Kogan, who worked on the budget in the Biden administration.

随着抑制措施的消失，美国的财政宽松变得更加极端。过去五年的平均赤字为 9%，是二战以来年平均赤字的四倍（见图 1）。这也几乎是其他发达经济体平均水平的两倍。这种奢侈行为无疑促进了当今经济的相对强势。民主党人对此毫无歉意，尤其是在新冠疫情低迷之后。 “我们从之前的经济衰退中了解到，规模太小会给美国人民带来重大代价。这次我们没有这样做。” 在拜登政府中负责预算工作的博比 · 科根 (Bobby Kogan) 说道。

Chart: The Economist 图表：《经济学家》

The frenetic expansion of America’s debts is now being reinforced by rising interest rates. In the two decades before covid, interest payments accounted for about a third of the federal deficit every year. Over the next two decades, the CBO reckons, interest will make up two-thirds of the deficit every year. “Every bit of higher interest rates matters a lot more when debt is about 100% of GDP. So this is a much larger risk now than it used to be,” says Doug Elmendorf, another former director of the cBO.

利率上升现在加剧了美国债务的疯狂扩张。在新冠疫情爆发之前的二十年里，利息支付每年约占联邦赤字的三分之一。国会预算办公室估计，未来二十年，每年利息将占赤字的三分之二。 “当债务约占 GDP 的 100% 时，利率的每一点上升都更加重要。因此，现在的风险比以前大得多，” 国会预算办公室另一位前主任道格 · 埃尔门多夫 (Doug Elmendorf) 表示。

Putting all this together, the CBO forecasts that America’s debt-to-GDP ratio will rise from the current 96% to about 166% over the next 30 years (see chart 2). As alarming as that sounds, it is hard to judge when a crisis will strike. Japan’s net debt is about 155% of GDP, yet it has no trouble issuing new bonds. America may have extra latitude given the dollar’s role as the pre-eminent global currency, which ensures a healthy foreign appetite for its debt.

综合所有这些，国会预算办公室预测，未来 30 年美国的债务与 GDP 之比将从目前的 96% 上升至 166% 左右（见图 2）。尽管这听起来令人震惊，但很难判断危机何时会爆发。日本的净债务约占 GDP 的 155%，但发行新债券却没有困难。鉴于美元作为卓越的全球货币的地位，美国可能拥有额外的自由度，这确保了外国对其债务的健康胃口。

Yet Japan has only stayed on top of its obligations thanks to extremely low interest rates. As a share of GDP America’s public interest costs are already roughly double Japan’s. By the end of the decade the only European country with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio is likely to be Italy. And America’s public finances are fraying quickly: to stabilise its debt-to-GDP ratio by 2029, the IMF reckons that it needs to trim its primary deficit (ie, before interest payments) by about 4% of GDP—more than any other big wealthy economy. Bond markets have started to get skittish. Yields surged last autumn when the Treasury announced bigger-than-expected borrowing plans, an event that may become more frequent given rising deficit projections.

然而，由于利率极低，日本才得以履行其义务。美国的公共利益成本占国内生产总值的比例大约是日本的两倍。到本世纪末，唯一债务与国内生产总值比率较高的欧洲国家可能是意大利。美国的公共财政正在迅速恶化：为了到 2029 年稳定其债务与 GDP 的比率，国际货币基金组织认为，它需要将其基本赤字（即利息支付前）削减约占 GDP 的 4%——比任何其他大国都要多。富裕的经济。债券市场已经开始变得不安。去年秋天，当财政部宣布超出预期的借贷计划时，收益率飙升，鉴于赤字预测不断上升，这种事件可能会变得更加频繁。

Mark Dowding of BlueBay, an asset manager, describes it as a faultline under the American economy. The risks are evident but it is impossible to predict when the problem will strike. “Sooner or later, a big earthquake is going to become overdue,” he says. Mr Hall recalls the difficulty of conveying this point to congressional leaders when he led the CBO. “They would ask, ‘Well, if it is unsustainable, when will it blow up?’ And of course the answer is, we don’t know,” he says. “But we are counting on investors being willing to continually buy government debt. We’re just waiting until the crisis comes.”

资产管理公司 BlueeBay 的马克 · 道丁 (Mark Dowding) 将其描述为美国经济的断层线。风险是显而易见的，但无法预测问题何时会出现。 “迟早会发生一场大地震，” 他说。霍尔先生回忆起他在领导国会预算办公室时向国会领导人传达这一点的困难。 “他们会问，‘好吧，如果它不可持续，那么它什么时候会爆发？’当然答案是，我们不知道，” 他说。 “但我们指望投资者愿意继续购买政府债券。我们只是等待危机的到来。”

$3trn question  三万亿问题

The campaigning may hinge on Mr Trump’s character and Mr Biden’s stamina, but the presidential election will also mark a fiscal watershed. At the end of 2025 many of the personal income-tax cuts that Mr Trump initiated in 2017 are set to expire. Leaving them all in place would cost about $3trn over the next decade. Even by the spendthrift standards of Washington, that is a huge amount—about double federal spending on transport.

竞选活动可能取决于特朗普的性格和拜登的耐力，但总统选举也将标志着财政分水岭。到 2025 年底，特朗普于 2017 年启动的许多个人所得税削减措施都将到期。在接下来的十年中，将它们全部保留到位将花费约 3 万亿美元。即使按照华盛顿的挥霍标准，这也是一个巨大的数字——大约是联邦交通支出的两倍。

In contrast, simply letting the tax cuts expire would shave about a percentage point off the annual deficit, a big improvement to America’s fiscal trajectory. But a sudden increase in taxes would be wildly unpopular and would presumably cause the economy to slow. No president would want to preside over such a shock, for fear of a popular backlash. So the question is not so much whether the next administration will extend the tax cuts but rather, will it preserve them in their entirety and what else will it do on the fiscal front?

相比之下，仅仅让减税政策到期就可以将年度赤字削减约一个百分点，这对美国的财政轨迹来说是一个巨大的改善。但突然增加税收将非常不受欢迎，并且可能会导致经济放缓。没有一位总统愿意主持这样一场震惊的会议，因为担心会引起民众的强烈反对。因此，问题不在于下一届政府是否会延长减税政策，而在于是否会完整保留减税政策以及在财政方面还会采取什么措施？

Mr Trump, unsurprisingly, has vowed to make all of his tax cuts permanent. He would also like to go further: he is reportedly weighing more cuts to corporate taxes. Mr Biden has described Mr Trump’s original tax cuts as reckless but his plan would nonetheless maintain them for people making less than $400,000 a year, at two-thirds of the original cost.

不出所料，特朗普发誓要将所有减税措施永久化。他还想走得更远：据报道，他正在考虑进一步削减公司税。拜登称特朗普最初的减税政策是鲁莽的，但他的计划仍然会为年收入低于 40 万美元的人维持减税政策，成本是原始成本的三分之二。

Both candidates pay lip-service to fiscal rectitude. Mr Trump talks of paying down the debt by bringing in more revenue from oil drilling—a preposterous idea, given that the federal government only derives a minuscule portion of its revenue from oil. He also wants to raise one sort of tax: tariffs on trade. Mr Trump’s proposal of a 10% universal tariff would bring in about $300bn a year, or 1% of GDP (largely paid for by American consumers, who would see the price of imported goods rise). But these receipts would be eaten up by the extension of the 2017 tax cuts, plus any new cuts. The net effect would be a slightly higher deficit, according to Goldman Sachs, a bank.

两位候选人都口头上支持财政廉洁。特朗普谈到通过从石油钻探中获得更多收入来偿还债务——这是一个荒谬的想法，因为联邦政府仅从石油中获得了极小的一部分收入。他还想提高一种税收：贸易关税。特朗普提出的 10% 普遍关税将每年带来约 3000 亿美元的收入，即 GDP 的 1%（主要由美国消费者支付，他们会看到进口商品价格上涨）。但这些收入将因 2017 年减税政策的延长以及任何新的减税政策而被耗尽。高盛银行表示，最终的影响将是赤字略有上升。

Mr Biden’s fiscal ideas are more credible. As well as lowering drug costs and giving the Internal Revenue Service more funding to chase tax cheats, he has proposed a bevy of taxes on the rich and powerful, including higher corporate taxes. But even if Democrats managed an improbable sweep of Congress and so could impose new taxes, it is unlikely that Mr Biden would use all the resulting income to trim the deficit. “There will be lots of pressure on him to use new revenues for new spending programmes,” says Maya MacGuineas of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, a non-profit group. Mr Biden has promised, among other things, to restore a generous tax credit for families with young children, to fund child care and to forgive student debt.

拜登的财政想法更加可信。除了降低药品成本并为国税局提供更多资金来追查逃税行为外，他还提议对富人和有权势的人征收一系列税收，包括提高企业税。但即使民主党在国会取得了不可思议的胜利，因此可以征收新税，拜登也不太可能用由此产生的所有收入来削减赤字。 “他将承受很大的压力，要求他将新的收入用于新的支出计划，” 非营利组织负责任联邦预算委员会的玛雅 · 麦吉尼斯 (Maya MacGuineas) 说。拜登先生承诺，除其他外，将恢复对有幼儿的家庭的慷慨税收抵免，为儿童保育提供资金并免除学生债务。

In all likelihood America will end up with divided government. At one time that might have been a recipe for fiscal restraint, with Democrats’ spending plans scaled back and Republicans’ tax cuts thwarted. But restraint is relative these days: after all, the past two years of divided government have brought gaping deficits. Neither party is willing to cut Social Security (the state pension) and Medicare (government-funded health care for the elderly), which together will hoover up some 60% of all federal spending excluding interest payments by the end of the decade. “Politicians have pledged not to touch them because that’s good politics in an election year. And it will still be good politics in 2025 and 2026,” says Mr Elmendorf.

美国很可能最终会出现分裂的政府。一度这可能是财政紧缩的良方，因为民主党的支出计划缩减，共和党的减税计划受阻。但如今的克制是相对的：毕竟，过去两年的政府分裂带来了巨额赤字。两党都不愿意削减社会保障（国家养老金）和医疗保险（政府资助的老年人医疗保健），到本世纪末，这两项支出将占据所有联邦支出（不包括利息支出）的约 60%。 “政客们已承诺不会碰它们，因为这在选举年是很好的政治。到 2025 年和 2026 年，这仍将是良好的政治前景。” 埃尔门多夫先生表示。

The biggest unknown is Mr Trump. It is his broader agenda, rather than his fiscal policies, that is most concerning. If his tariffs drive up the cost of imports, they will fuel inflation. A crackdown on immigration would impede the growth in the labour force that has been boosting the economy of late. “If you went into a lab and wanted to construct a policy backdrop to increase the probability of higher structural inflation, it would be exactly what Trump is proposing,” says Michael Medeiros of Wellington, an asset manager.

最大的未知数是特朗普先生。最令人担忧的是他更广泛的议程，而不是他的财政政策。如果他的关税推高进口成本，就会加剧通货膨胀。对移民的打击将阻碍劳动力的增长，而劳动力的增长一直在推动经济发展。惠灵顿资产管理公司迈克尔 · 梅代罗斯 (Michael Medeiros) 表示：“如果你走进实验室，想要构建一个政策背景来增加结构性通胀上升的可能性，那么这正是特朗普所提议的。”

Then there are the ideas bandied about by Mr Trump’s advisers. Robert Lighthizer, seen as a candidate for a big economic post in a Trump administration, has flirted with devaluing the dollar as a lever for reducing America’s trade deficits. Mr Trump’s allies have also drawn up proposals—reported by the Wall Street Journal—to curtail the Federal Reserve’s independence, perhaps requiring the central bank to consult with the president before making decisions about interest rates.

还有特朗普的顾问们四处散布的想法。被视为特朗普政府重要经济职位候选人的罗伯特 · 莱特希泽 (Robert Lighthizer) 曾考虑让美元贬值，以此作为减少美国贸易赤字的杠杆。据《华尔街日报》报道，特朗普的盟友还起草了限制美联储独立性的提案，或许要求美联储在做出利率决定之前与总统协商。

Whether Mr Trump supports these ideas is unknown; he may not have made up his mind. Any efforts to engineer a weak dollar or to check the Fed’s hard-earned independence would raise alarm bells in global markets, making America look like a banana republic. That could set off a vicious cycle: investors may start to demand higher returns on American bonds, which would drive up the government’s interest bill and, in turn, aggravate its debt woes.

特朗普是否支持这些想法尚不得而知；他可能还没有下定决心。任何制造美元疲软或检查美联储来之不易的独立性的努力都会在全球市场敲响警钟，让美国看起来像一个香蕉共和国。这可能会引发恶性循环：投资者可能开始要求美国债券获得更高的回报，这将推高政府的利息支出，进而加剧其债务困境。

Illustration: Carl Godfrey

插图：卡尔 · 戈弗雷

Even without such spurs, America may have already embarked on a milder version of this cycle. The IMF reckons that loose fiscal policy has become a bigger contributor to its stubbornly high inflation than other factors affecting demand and supply. And inflation is, of course, the reason why the Fed has maintained elevated interest rates, thereby raising the government’s financing costs. Back in January markets expected about 1.5 percentage points in rate cuts this year. If those were to materialise, the Treasury would end up paying about $1.2trn in interest during 2024, according to analysts at the Bank of America. If, however, the Fed holds rates at their current level, as many investors now anticipate, the Treasury’s interest payments will instead reach $1.6trn. The difference—$400bn—adds more than a percentage point to the federal deficit.

即使没有这样的刺激，美国也可能已经开始了这一周期的温和版本。国际货币基金组织认为，与影响供需的其他因素相比，宽松的财政政策已成为导致通胀居高不下的更大因素。当然，通货膨胀是美联储维持高利率的原因，从而提高了政府的融资成本。早在一月份，市场就预计今年降息幅度约为 1.5 个百分点。美国银行分析师表示，如果这些成为现实，财政部最终将在 2024 年支付约 1.2 万亿美元的利息。然而，如果美联储像许多投资者现在预期的那样将利率维持在当前水平，那么财政部的利息支出将达到 1.6 万亿美元。这一差异——4000 亿美元——使联邦赤字增加了一个百分点以上。

Continuing down this path would land America in an uncomfortable new environment. With real interest rates settling at a higher level than in the pre-covid decade, companies and individuals would face higher financing costs, dragging down investment and, eventually, productivity. The government would devote most of its budget to paying interest and supporting retirees, squeezing the funds available for roads, schools, scientific research and more. Amid disappointing growth, the country’s debt dynamics would worsen. This would not be an imminent crisis, but it would chip away at the economy’s momentum. Having outpaced all other big wealthy countries for decades, America might instead lag.

继续沿着这条道路走下去将使美国陷入一个令人不安的新环境。由于实际利率处于比新冠疫情前十年更高的水平，公司和个人将面临更高的融资成本，从而拖累投资，最终拖累生产率。政府将把大部分预算用于支付利息和支持退休人员，压缩用于道路、学校、科学研究等的资金。在增长令人失望的情况下，该国的债务动态将会恶化。这不会是一场迫在眉睫的危机，但会削弱经济的动力。美国几十年来一直领先于所有其他富裕国家，但现在可能反而落后。

How might it all end? A sovereign default is impossible because all America’s debts are denominated in dollars, and the government can always create money to pay them off. Still, there are other extreme scenarios. One is “fiscal dominance”, when a central bank is forced to print money to finance a deficit, driving inflation so high it erodes the value of ordinary people’s savings. This would be a disguised form of taxation, in effect. Mercifully, it remains an unlikely prospect in America. After all, the Fed has jacked up rates, despite the grim fiscal picture.

这一切会如何结束？主权违约是不可能的，因为美国所有的债务都是以美元计价的，而政府总是可以创造货币来偿还债务。不过，还有其他极端情况。一是 “财政主导”，即央行被迫印钞来弥补赤字，从而推高通货膨胀，侵蚀普通民众的储蓄价值。实际上，这将是一种变相的税收形式。幸运的是，这在美国仍然不太可能实现。毕竟，尽管财政形势严峻，美联储还是提高了利率。

Another possibility is “financial repression”, when people are forced to lend to the government to hold down its borrowing costs. Again, that sounds far-fetched in a country like America. But Sonal Desai of Franklin Templeton, an asset manager, reckons that some current arrangements are a step in this direction. Notably, to meet liquidity rules, banks must hold lots of Treasuries. The intention is to safeguard banks against runs, but a side-effect is to create a large, captive pool of buyers for American government debt. “The bottom line is that there is an element of financial repression,” she says.

另一种可能性是 “金融抑制”，即人们被迫向政府贷款以压低借贷成本。再说一遍，这在美国这样的国家听起来有些牵强。但资产管理公司富兰克林邓普顿的索纳尔 · 德赛认为，目前的一些安排是朝这个方向迈出的一步。值得注意的是，为了满足流动性规则，银行必须持有大量国债。其目的是保护银行免受挤兑，但副作用是为美国政府债务创造了一个庞大的、受限制的买家群体。 “底线是存在金融抑制的因素，” 她说。

A more optimistic scenario is that America reins in its debt before it is too late. Perhaps, as in the 1990s, it may benefit from higher growth brought on by rising productivity, this time owing to the spread of artificial intelligence. Regrettably, it seems more likely that a crisis will be needed to bring the country to its fiscal senses. This could come in many forms. One is the ticking clock of Social Security and Medicare. The trust funds that provide a big chunk of their funding will run out of cash in the early 2030s. This, in theory, would force the government to slash benefits to retirees, an outcome so terrifying to politicians that they may at last try to find better ways to make the two schemes affordable.

更乐观的情况是，美国在为时已晚之前控制债务。也许，就像 20 世纪 90 年代一样，它可能会受益于生产率提高带来的更高增长，这一次是由于人工智能的传播。遗憾的是，似乎更有可能需要一场危机才能让该国恢复财政意识。这可以有多种形式。一是社会保障和医疗保险的时钟滴答作响。提供大量资金的信托基金将在 2030 年代初耗尽现金。从理论上讲，这将迫使政府削减退休人员的福利，这一结果对政客来说是如此可怕，以至于他们最终可能会试图找到更好的方法，使这两个计划变得负担得起。

Rolling, rolling, rolling

滚滚、滚滚、滚滚

Another crunch could stem from America’s gargantuan borrowing needs. In 2024 alone it must roll over about a third of its existing debt and also finance its growing deficit. To do so, the government needs to find buyers for about $10trn of bonds this year, according to Torsten Slok of Apollo, a fund manager. The scale of borrowing will increase with each passing year.

另一场紧缩可能源于美国庞大的借贷需求。仅在 2024 年，它就必须展期约三分之一的现有债务，并为其不断增长的赤字提供融资。 Apollo 基金经理 Torsten Slok 表示，要做到这一点，政府今年需要寻找约 10 万亿美元债券的买家。借贷规模逐年增加。

As the scale of Treasury auctions grows ever more daunting, the chance of turbulence rises. As happened last autumn, demand may fall short unless the government offers higher yields. That would send tremors through markets. Paul Winfree, a budget adviser in Mr Trump’s White House, thinks it might take such a disturbance to shake Washington out of its slumber. “The Treasury would come to Congress and say, ‘You need to send out a credible signal to markets that you are committed to doing something on the deficit,’” says Mr Winfree. “And then they would act.”

随着国债拍卖的规模变得越来越令人望而生畏，出现动荡的可能性也随之增加。正如去年秋天发生的那样，除非政府提供更高的收益率，否则需求可能会不足。这将给市场带来震动。特朗普白宫预算顾问保罗 · 温弗里认为，可能需要这样的骚乱才能让华盛顿从沉睡中醒来。温弗里先生表示：“财政部会向国会表示，‘你们需要向市场发出可靠的信号，表明你们致力于解决赤字问题。’” “然后他们就会采取行动。”

Matt Eagan of Loomis Sayles, an investment manager, thinks of it as the return of what political types used to call “bond vigilantes”: twitchy markets that force fiscal prudence on politicians. “Five years ago, I would have said there is a low probability. Today, you have to say that there is a possibility,” he says. If the vigilantes do strike, the damage will depend on the economic context. The government has put America in a dangerous spot by running such a high deficit over the past couple of years, even though employment has been strong. Were a bond auction to stumble as the economy is slowing, it might have to do the reverse: impose austerity even though the job market is weakening. “Where you would normally use easier fiscal policy, you may actually be forced in the other direction,” says Mr Dowding.

投资经理卢米斯 · 赛尔斯 (Loomis Sayles) 的马特 · 伊根 (Matt Eagan) 认为，这是政治类型过去所谓的 “债券义务警员” 的回归：动荡的市场迫使政客采取财政审慎态度。 “五年前，我会说可能性很小。今天，你必须说有这种可能性，”他说。如果治安维持者真的发动袭击，造成的损失将取决于经济环境。尽管就业一直强劲，但政府在过去几年中仍保持如此高的赤字，使美国陷入危险境地。如果债券拍卖随着经济放缓而陷入困境，它可能不得不采取相反的做法：即使就业市场正在疲软，也要实施紧缩政策。道丁表示：“在通常会使用更宽松财政政策的地方，实际上可能会被迫走向另一个方向。”

There is no way of knowing if or when any of this will come to pass. But the likelihood of such harrowing scenarios is growing. For the past decade America’s politicians have got away with ignoring budgetary constraints and would like to continue. But fiscal arithmetic and jittery investors will eventually put a halt to the party. ■

没有办法知道这一切是否或何时会发生。但出现这种悲惨情景的可能性正在增加。过去十年来，美国政客们一直无视预算限制，并且愿意继续下去。但财政算计和紧张不安的投资者最终将阻止这场盛会。