经济学人：
Nazem Ahmad, an art collector and financier, who owns work by Andy Warhol and Pablo Picasso, has been under American sanctions since 2019. That may sound like a problem, but it has not stopped him from smuggling half a billion or so dollars for Hizbullah, a Lebanese militant group, according to America’s Treasury. He moves art, cash and gems across borders via galleries in the Ivory Coast, family offices in the UAE and portfolio firms in Hong Kong. His financial tapestry is underpinned by bank accounts in America.
艺术收藏家兼金融家纳齐姆 · 艾哈迈德 (Nazem Ahmad) 拥有安迪 · 沃霍尔 (Andy Warhol) 和巴勃罗 · 毕加索 (Pablo Picasso) 的作品，自 2019 年以来一直受到美国制裁。这听起来可能是个问题，但这并没有阻止他为真主党走私 5 亿左右美元据美国财政部称，黎巴嫩激进组织。他通过科特迪瓦的画廊、阿联酋的家族办公室和香港的投资组合公司跨境转移艺术品、现金和宝石。他的金融体系以美国的银行账户为基础。
All of this displeases Western policymakers, who are trying to make sanctions more stringent. Mr Ahmad is one of several magnates on whom sanctions have been adjusted. The EU’s 13th wave of measures against Russia, agreed on February 21st, will punish some Chinese firms for supplying Vladimir Putin with weaponry and other banned goods. President Joe Biden has announced that foreign banks settling payments for such goods could be next, and is planning more sanctions on Russia after the death of Alexei Navalny, an opposition politician, on February 16th. In recent years measures have been applied to everyone from Houthis holding up Red Sea traffic to Israeli settlers building illegally in the West Bank and companies helping strengthen China’s armed forces.
所有这些都令西方政策制定者感到不满，他们正试图加大制裁力度。艾哈迈德先生是制裁调整后的几位巨头之一。欧盟于 2 月 21 日商定的针对俄罗斯的第 13 波措施将惩罚一些向弗拉基米尔 · 普京提供武器和其他违禁商品的中国公司。总统乔 · 拜登宣布，下一个可能是由外国银行为此类商品进行结算，并计划在 2 月 16 日反对派政客阿列克谢 · 纳瓦尔尼去世后对俄罗斯实施更多制裁。近年来，从阻碍红海交通的胡塞武装到在约旦河西岸非法建筑的以色列定居者，再到帮助加强中国武装力量的公司，所有人都受到了制裁。
Thus the world is witnessing an unprecedented surge in financial warfare. But just as the West ratchets up sanctions, ways to circumvent them are becoming more sophisticated. Visit any country that courts the West’s business without buying into its principles, and you will find companies and people—hailing from China, Russia and the Middle East—under sanction and getting things done. Since the West first retaliated against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is in places such as India, Indonesia and the UAE, which have access to the dollar, that America’s and Europe’s aims are being thwarted.
因此，世界正在目睹前所未有的金融战激增。但就在西方加大制裁力度的同时，规避制裁的方法也变得更加复杂。访问任何一个吸引西方企业而不接受其原则的国家，你会发现来自中国、俄罗斯和中东的公司和个人受到制裁并完成任务。自从西方首先对俄罗斯入侵乌克兰进行报复以来，正是在印度、印度尼西亚和阿联酋等可以使用美元的国家，美国和欧洲的目标受到了阻碍。
Any enemy of the West faces a mixture of measures. Most common are trade embargoes, under which Iran and Russia labour. American companies are banned from exporting anything that could be repurposed by Russia’s army, which ranges from drones to ball-bearings. Import restrictions on commodities, such as the $60-a-barrel price cap imposed on Russian oil by America and Europe, are meant to weaken hostile powers. Bans on doing business with governments, as also apply to Iran’s and Russia’s, are supposed to further cripple their ability to fight.
西方的任何敌人都面临着多种措施。最常见的是贸易禁运，伊朗和俄罗斯都受到贸易禁运的影响。美国公司被禁止出口任何可能被俄罗斯军队重新利用的物品，从无人机到滚珠轴承。对大宗商品的进口限制，例如美国和欧洲对俄罗斯石油实行每桶 60 美元的价格上限，旨在削弱敌对势力。与政府开展业务的禁令（也适用于伊朗和俄罗斯）应该会进一步削弱他们的战斗能力。
On top of these are financial sanctions. Western officials keep blacklists, which apply varying restrictions on how their citizens may deal with designated firms and people. Ships that carry Iranian oil are on America’s list, as are Hamas’s leaders and financiers for Latin American drug empires. Sometimes individuals’ assets are frozen; sometimes entire banks are banned. Russia’s central-bank reserves in Europe (half its total) have been frozen, 80% of its banks are subject to sanctions and seven are locked out of SWIFT, a messaging service used to make transactions.
最重要的是金融制裁。西方官员保留黑名单，对其公民如何与指定公司和个人打交道施加不同的限制。运载伊朗石油的船只以及哈马斯的领导人和拉丁美洲毒品帝国的金融家都在美国的名单上。有时个人资产会被冻结；有时整个银行都被禁止。俄罗斯央行在欧洲的储备（占总数的一半）已被冻结，80% 的银行受到制裁，7 家银行无法使用 Swift（一种用于交易的消息服务）。
Yet all these measures must contend with the growing prosperity and financial sophistication of “third countries”—ones that neither impose American and European sanctions, nor are under sanctions themselves. The 120 members of the “non-aligned movement”, which include Brazil and India, produced 38% of global GDP in 2022, up from 15% in 1990. They are home to five of the world’s 20 most important financial hubs, measured by the number and variety of banks, and churn out lots that a modern army might need. Whereas financial crises in the 1980s and 1990s drove entire continents to borrow from the IMF, today these countries have robust financial systems. With international firms trying to avoid tensions between America and China, sitting on the fence is not only possible, but often profitable.
然而，所有这些措施都必须应对 “第三国” 的日益繁荣和金融复杂性——这些国家既不实施美国和欧洲制裁，也不受到制裁。包括巴西和印度在内的 120 个 “不结盟运动” 成员国的 GDP 占全球 GDP 的比重从 1990 年的 15% 上升到 2022 年的 38%。按银行的数量和种类，并大量生产现代军队可能需要的产品。 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的金融危机迫使整个大陆向国际货币基金组织借款，而如今这些国家拥有稳健的金融体系。由于国际公司试图避免中美之间的紧张关系，骑墙不仅是可能的，而且往往是有利可图的。
Brazil, India and Mexico all declined to participate in the West’s economic war soon after Russia invaded Ukraine. Indonesia’s foreign-affairs spokesman explained that his country would “not blindly follow the steps taken by another country”. Yet neutrality is a delicate game. Although, for instance, America can do little about Russia importing more tech from China, it can make life difficult for some financial institutions that might help the trade. Among third countries, hostility to America’s actions combines with reliance on the superpower’s financial system to produce a strange patchwork: in places sanctions are insurmountable; in others they may as well be non-existent.
在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后不久，巴西、印度和墨西哥都拒绝参与西方的经济战争。印度尼西亚外交事务发言人解释说，印度尼西亚 “不会盲目追随其他国家采取的步骤”。然而中立是一场微妙的游戏。例如，尽管美国对俄罗斯从中国进口更多技术无能为力，但这可能会让一些可能帮助贸易的金融机构日子不好过。在第三国中，对美国行动的敌意与对超级大国金融体系的依赖相结合，产生了一种奇怪的拼凑现象：在一些地方制裁是难以克服的；在一些地方，制裁是难以克服的；在一些地方，制裁是难以克服的；在其他情况下，它们也可能不存在。
Commodity-import bans are the measure most obviously ignored by non-aligned countries. Although the purchase of Iran’s oil is restricted by America, its exports are at an all-time high. Countries that are not party to the West’s price cap on Russian oil—together home to half the world’s population—are willing to pay more than $60 a barrel. Brazil, China and India have all bought more of the stuff since the war in Ukraine began. Many of the country’s biggest customers, including the UAE and Turkey, import its cheap fuel for domestic use at the same time as exporting their own more expensive non-embargoed oil. In 2022 China, India, Singapore, Turkey and the UAE together imported $50bn more oil from Russia than in 2021. Meanwhile, the value of the EU’s oil imports from these countries increased by $20bn.
商品进口禁令是不结盟国家最明显忽视的措施。尽管伊朗石油的购买受到美国的限制，但其出口量却创历史新高。不参与西方对俄罗斯石油价格上限的国家——这些国家人口占世界一半——愿意支付每桶 60 美元以上的价格。自乌克兰战争爆发以来，巴西、中国和印度都购买了更多此类产品。该国许多最大的客户，包括阿联酋和土耳其，进口其廉价燃料供国内使用，同时出口自己更昂贵的非禁运石油。 2022 年，中国、印度、新加坡、土耳其和阿联酋从俄罗斯进口的石油总额比 2021 年增加了 500 亿美元。与此同时，欧盟从这些国家进口的石油价值增加了200 亿美元。
Legitimate trade helps hide goods that end up furnishing a bomb or tank. As a result, half the military equipment gathered by Russia last year contained some Western tech. Indeed, Russia imported more than $1bn-worth of chips designed in the West—all of which should have been beyond its reach. European exports to Central Asia more than doubled from 2021 to 2023. The region’s fastest-growing industry is logistics, which expanded by 20% in 2023. It is not difficult to guess the final destination of many of these goods.
合法贸易有助于隐藏最终成为炸弹或坦克的货物。因此，俄罗斯去年收集的一半军事装备都包含一些西方技术。事实上，俄罗斯进口了价值超过 10 亿美元的西方设计芯片——所有这些本应超出其能力范围。 2021 年至 2023 年，欧洲对中亚的出口增加了一倍多。该地区增长最快的行业是物流，2023 年增长了 20%。不难猜测其中许多货物的最终目的地。
America’s recent tougher stance has made dodging trade sanctions harder. It helps that earlier rules are also starting to bite. Half the ships that belong to Western firms and once ferried Russia’s oil have turned to new work. And Mr Biden has now given officials authority to put “secondary sanctions”—which apply to outfits outside America and its adversary—on banks that help smuggle military tech to Russia. According to Bloomberg, a news service, two state-owned Chinese financial institutions have since stopped taking Russian payment for forbidden items.
美国最近采取的更强硬立场使得躲避贸易制裁变得更加困难。早期的规则也开始发挥作用，这很有帮助。曾经运送俄罗斯石油的西方公司的船只有一半已经转向新的工作。拜登现在已授权官员对帮助向俄罗斯走私军事技术的银行实施 “二级制裁”——适用于美国及其对手以外的机构。据新闻机构彭博社报道，中国两家国有金融机构已停止接受俄罗斯支付的违禁物品付款。
Ghost ships 幽灵船
Yet lots of business has simply moved beyond the West’s reach. When America and Europe banned firms from insuring ships that carry Russian oil if it sells above their price limit, India and Russia established their own insurers. Russia’s shadow fleet now carries 75% of its oil shipments. At the same time, trade between Russia and the West via places such as Central Asia and Thailand is only growing as companies have more time to set up shop.
然而，许多业务已经超出了西方的能力范围。当美国和欧洲禁止公司为运载俄罗斯石油的船只提供保险（如果石油售价高于其价格限制）时，印度和俄罗斯成立了自己的保险公司。俄罗斯的影子船队目前承担着该国 75% 的石油运输量。与此同时，随着企业有更多时间开店，俄罗斯与西方通过中亚和泰国等地进行的贸易只会增长。
When it comes to financial measures, third countries facilitate sanctions-dodging in two ways. The first is by expanding the options open to the West’s enemies. Institutions in America and Europe are banned from handling transactions that involve anything on blacklists, on pain of incurring sanctions themselves. Yet, in most cases, once cash leaves the West, blacklists carry no threat. Dubai’s financial industry has grown faster than any other over the past decade, with the exception of Shenzhen, and its expansion has been fuelled by grey money. Other important hubs include Hong Kong and São Paulo.
在金融措施方面，第三国通过两种方式促进规避制裁。首先是扩大西方敌人的选择范围。美国和欧洲的机构被禁止处理涉及黑名单上的任何交易，否则将受到制裁。然而，在大多数情况下，一旦现金离开西方，黑名单就不再构成威胁。过去十年，迪拜金融业的增长速度是除深圳之外的其他任何一个城市都快，其扩张是由灰色资金推动的。其他重要枢纽包括香港和圣保罗。
Many third countries participate in rouble- and yuan-based payment systems—efforts by Russia and China to build dollar alternatives. The UAE and Russia have teamed up to work on a rouble-based payment system that will be regulated from Dubai. And Indonesia is participating in trials for China’s international digital currency. Although these efforts sound fearsome, the reality is less bad. Just as many of the world’s transactions are settled in dollars and euros as on the eve Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is often seen as a victory for the West: the dollar, and therefore surely the West’s arsenal of financial weaponry, remains dominant.
许多第三国参与了以卢布和人民币为基础的支付系统——俄罗斯和中国努力建立美元替代品。阿联酋和俄罗斯已联手开发基于卢布的支付系统，该系统将由迪拜监管。印度尼西亚正在参与中国国际数字货币的试验。尽管这些努力听起来很可怕，但现实并没有那么糟糕。就像俄罗斯入侵乌克兰前夕一样，世界上许多交易都是以美元和欧元结算的。这通常被视为西方的胜利：美元以及因此西方的金融武器库无疑仍然占据主导地位。
Yet there is a second, increasingly important way in which third countries thwart the West: they facilitate evasion while still using the dollar. Some foreign banks are much more relaxed about scrutiny than their American and European peers, and more of their business is now done without touching American shores. Whereas they used to rely on American branches for dollar funding, now they have $13trn—equivalent to more than half of the dollar liabilities of America’s banking system—borrowed from offshore sources.
然而，第三国还有第二种日益重要的方式来阻碍西方：它们在仍然使用美元的同时促进逃税。一些外国银行在审查方面比美国和欧洲同行宽松得多，而且现在它们的更多业务是在不涉及美国海岸的情况下完成的。虽然他们过去依赖美国分行提供美元资金，但现在他们从海外借款了 13 万亿美元——相当于美国银行系统美元负债的一半以上。
Without co-operation from these institutions, it is difficult for Western banks to work out when something is off, meaning that sanctions fail to make use of the West’s financial sprawl. Rules often contain carve-outs: funds are allowed to reach Iran for humanitarian aid, for instance, and Russia for agricultural transactions. Several people under sanction report that it is common practice to mislabel money. America has accused Kuveyt Turk—among the biggest banks in Turkey—of similar tricks, which it has denied. The EU reckons that Varengold Bank, a German institution, allowed millions of dollars to pass to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps through third countries, on the grounds it was food aid. Varengold denies wrongdoing and says that the cash was desperately needed to alleviate suffering.
如果没有这些机构的合作，西方银行很难发现问题所在，这意味着制裁无法利用西方的金融扩张。规则通常包含例外情况：例如，允许资金进入伊朗进行人道主义援助，允许资金进入俄罗斯进行农业交易。一些受到制裁的人报告说，给钱贴错标签是很常见的做法。美国指责土耳其最大的银行 Kuveyt Turk 采取类似的伎俩，但美国对此予以否认。欧盟认为，德国机构瓦伦戈尔德银行允许数百万美元通过第三国转给伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队，理由是这是粮食援助。瓦伦戈尔德否认有不当行为，并表示迫切需要这笔现金来减轻痛苦。
Botched identification checks also help. More than 1,000 Russian firms have set up shop in Turkey since 2022, as well as 500 in the UAE, many of which Western officials think are fronts for others under sanctions. As lots are registered in “free zones”, meant to tempt business with a lack of red tape, it is hard to know for sure. Two years ago, a Singapore-based network of firms was punished for ferrying billions of dollars of payments for Iranian oil. It re-emerged in Dubai, using a mixture of Turkish, Singaporean and UAE-based firms to open American bank accounts.
拙劣的身份检查也有帮助。自 2022 年以来，已有 1000 多家俄罗斯公司在土耳其设立了办事处，在阿联酋也有 500 家公司，其中许多公司被西方官员认为是其他受制裁国家的幌子。由于地块是在 “自由区” 注册的，旨在通过缺乏繁文缛节来吸引企业，因此很难确定。两年前，一家总部位于新加坡的公司网络因为伊朗石油支付数十亿美元的款项而受到惩罚。它在迪拜重新出现，利用土耳其、新加坡和阿联酋的公司开设美国银行账户。
Many third-country governments have a laissez-faire attitude to sanctions-breaking, or even tacitly approve of it. Indonesia and the UAE are on the greylist of the Financial Action Task Force, an international regulator, in part because they are accused of knowing about the bad behaviour of local banks. When asked whether the UAE thinks that some of its 500 new firms could be evading sanctions, a European official shrugs: “They know, they just don’t care.”
许多第三国政府对违反制裁行为持放任态度，甚至默许。印度尼西亚和阿联酋被列入国际监管机构金融行动特别工作组的灰名单，部分原因是它们被指控了解当地银行的不良行为。当被问及阿联酋是否认为其 500 家新公司中的一些可以逃避制裁时，一位欧洲官员耸耸肩：“他们知道，只是不在乎。”
The increasing commercial importance of these countries has both raised the costs and lowered the benefits of Western sanctions. American and European capital can now take advantage of investment opportunities abroad. Companies and individuals under sanction now have more places in which they can do business. What, then, can the West do?
这些国家日益增长的商业重要性既增加了西方制裁的成本，也降低了其收益。美国和欧洲资本现在可以利用海外投资机会。受制裁的公司和个人现在有更多的地方可以开展业务。那么，西方能做什么呢？
Western leaders have so far shied away from the most drastic measures. Mr Biden has said that he will eject foreign banks from America’s financial system if they help provide Russia with weaponry. But he has declined to issue the same threat over anything else, and the willingness of his officials to enforce it remains to be seen. Similar moves in the past have targeted tiny banks and been enforced in conjunction with local authorities. Doing the same with big banks over which America has no legal power would mean lots of guesswork. European officials say that it often takes 30 steps along a financial chain to trace the owner of a foreign bank account—ten times more than a decade ago. And if America made greater use of such measures it would risk brutal fights with allies such as Turkey and Indonesia.
迄今为止，西方领导人一直避免采取最严厉的措施。拜登曾表示，如果外国银行帮助向俄罗斯提供武器，他将把它们逐出美国金融体系。但他拒绝对其他任何事情发出同样的威胁，而他的官员是否愿意执行这一威胁还有待观察。过去类似的举措针对的是小型银行，并与地方当局联合执行。对美国没有法律权力的大银行采取同样的做法将意味着大量的猜测。欧洲官员表示，通常需要沿着金融链经过 30 个步骤才能追踪到外国银行账户的所有者，这一数字是十多年前的十倍。如果美国更多地使用此类措施，它将面临与土耳其和印度尼西亚等盟友发生残酷战斗的风险。
More American action might reduce evasion in places that use the dollar, but at the cost of encouraging countries to shift away from the currency. During, say, the 1990s, countries relied on America’s financial system because it reached everywhere in the world, imposed relatively few costs and there was no alternative. All three reasons become less convincing as financial warfare becomes more intense. They would become still less convincing should American officials begin to intervene more often beyond their jurisdiction. Not all that much capital needs to flee to alternative financial systems built by rival countries, such as China, for sanctions, which already target a tiny portion of the world’s transactions, to lose even more power. The West’s campaign to reassert its dominance over the global financial system could see it lose control, once and for all. ■
美国采取更多行动可能会减少使用美元的国家的逃税行为，但代价是鼓励各国放弃使用美元。比如说，在 20 世纪 90 年代，各国依赖美国的金融体系，因为它的业务覆盖世界各地，成本相对较低，而且别无选择。随着金融战愈演愈烈，这三个理由都变得不再那么令人信服。如果美国官员开始更频繁地进行超出其管辖范围的干预，他们的说服力就会变得更差。并非所有资本都需要逃往中国等竞争对手建立的替代金融体系，因为制裁已经针对了世界交易的一小部分，从而失去更多权力。西方重申其对全球金融体系主导地位的运动可能会使其一劳永逸地失去控制。
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